§185 [172–174]

the treasure of the word (treasure as the origin of the “vocabulary” of “language”) must be experienced in the saying of beyng. Out of the apparently emptiest and poorest word, out of the “is” and its inceptual truth, there originates the ordained fullness of vocables and of their cases and inflections.

The thinking of the history of beyng thinks on the basis of the word of beyng. It seems that such thinking is merely arbitrary opinion which feeds on the dissection of the meaning of vocables. As if vocables, as well as their sound and meaning, could be objectively present in the manner of things. Heedfulness to beyng and the opposite, inattention to beyng, already lend a disposition to and determine the way the thinking of the history of beyng in the vocables of language hears the word at any time and on the basis of this word attempts to say it. Attentiveness to beyng is foreign to us. Just as speechlessness remains a “state” we want to overcome as quickly as possible and without being affected by it any further, so also the ability to speak and the technical dominance over the linguistic means are already sufficient proof of the assurance of mastering being (which here always means only beings).

The event is the richness of the simplicity in whose guise the turning of beyng eventuates while disposing and bestows the showing power of signs. This richness is self-sheltering because it goes down out of the inceptuality of the beginning into the departure. The appropriating event is beyng as the inceptual voice. The appropriating event is the treasure of the word. Nevertheless, the appropriating event, as beyng, is inceptually the relation to the essence of the historial human being, an essence which is thereby determined, as regards attitudes and comportments, with respect to this relation and thus with respect to disposedness through the voice. The relation eventuates in the departing-differentiating counter-turn.

From long habituation, we indeed think and reckon everywhere according to the directives of metaphysics. Under the domination of its essence, the stamp of being devolves upon beingness, and belonging together with this is the transformation of truth to the correctness of objectification. Inseparably from this nexus, the entrenchment of the human being into the animal rationale becomes valid, and so does the role of “grammar” and “logic” for the predelineation of the way the word is apprehended on the basis of the vocables of language and language is apprehended in a “technical”-instrumental sense.

Under the force of the metaphysical tradition, a force scarcely still felt and so released for the first time in all its might, it could almost seem impossible to think the inceptual essence of the word out of the event and to experience, within the event, the treasure of the word.