241. Disposition
disposes for the most proper determinateness of what is undetermined; the undetermined, but the disposed is the conjuncture of the appropriation of the inceptual.
*
Joy—the tending and preserving of the turn to the indigenous. to dispose—not to deal “with” disposition.
*
Bad temper is the rage which seeks to tear itself up.
Disposition is not indeterminate and abstract,
and
what is concrete is never the material;
these are “metaphysical” distinctions, not ones bearing on Da-sein.
242. “Disposition”
pain
with respect to the history of beyng
Everything to be thought about “dispositions” must be thought on the basis of the experience of beyng and of its question-worthiness, i.e., on the basis of pain as understood with respect to the history of beyng.3
It can never be demanded to treat “the dispositions” in themselves, as it were, to arrange them in an absolute hierarchy, and to lay them out as if they could be a matter of choice. In this domain, there is no question of an earlier, anthropologically postulated manifold of dispositions, which are then considered according to elation and depression, in order to play the dispositions off against one another and, above all, to choose those appropriate to the “heroic” and consequential “times.” In such a procedure, “anxiety,” especially in the usual misinterpretation, will of course appear at a disadvantage, provided it manages to avoid complete condemnation.
In Being and Time, “disposition” is grasped as “situatedness”4 [“Befindlichkeit”], which means that it must be experienced in terms of
3. (pain as the clearing of the difference—the difference itself) {Marginal remark in typescript}
4. In published translations of Being and Time: “state of mind” (Macquarrie and Robinson) and “attunement” (Stambaugh and Schmidt)—Trans.