demand that thinking and its concepts and terms be repeated and used (in fact the worst of the effects, all of which are bad), or people attempt to show appreciation for thinking, which is held to be abstract, by applying it in a practical way.
Instead, the task is simply to correspond to thinking, such that experience is more experienced and propositions are confronted with thoughtful speech. Instead of repeating propositions, the task is to come to self-clarity and to let oneself be determined by what is essential.
We must think about thinking (essence of truth). If this thinking is still to be called “logic,” then what is “logic”?! Certainly not a theory of propositions and representations.
275. The discrepancy in the priority of presentation6
1. If the conjuncture of beyng is to be said, then that requires, specifically for the thinking of the history of beyng, a thinking of the first beginning and of its advancement to metaphysics and also a thinking of metaphysics in its full history as the history of beingness and of the truth of beings. This truth itself restricts the essence of history and projects historiology as one with technology. But all this is then not presented, and the conjuncture of beyng appears to be detached arbitrariness, perhaps mitigated through the sounding.
2. If, before all else, the history of being, right from the first beginning, is to be told immediately, then it would be difficult to see whence history is already experienced in general as the history of being and not as an object of the historiology of philosophy. This introductory presentation is no less arbitrary. And this presentation arises out of the thinking of the conjuncture of beyng
3. Are both of these to be presented in the resonating? Sounding of the end of metaphysics—consonance in the beginning—resonating of the sounding and of the consonance.
276. The beginning—inexperience7
We are equally inexperienced, or indeed totally without experience, as regards both the first beginning and the other beginning, which in fact
6. Cf. the passing by; essentially toward experience.
7. The thinking of the history of beyng in its inception.