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§278 [253–254]

are not two different beginnings but, rather, one and the same beginning in each and every inceptuality. For we do not know the difference, and we do not surmise the departure. We are not a match for the downgoing and consider it merely an end and a collapse. We are inexperienced, “painless,” as regards the inceptuality of the beginning.

We know only the brutalitas of the will to power; and we believe we know something of “pain” when we report about it that we are capable of presentifying “pain,” whereby pain is still taken merely as a bodily state.

We must first learn experience. And above all the experience of the first and the other beginning; only in the relation essentially occurring between the two, for which we have no name, do we experience immediately the inceptuality and, in it, the appropriation of beyng. The steadfast standing in Da-sein originates from a standing out into the appropriating event. The abandonment by being, and the human being as understood anthropologically, correspond to each other. Taken for themselves, they constitute the insurmountable barrier which, as metaphysics, has been thrust up between beyng and the human being.


277. The inconsolable departure


The twisting free is not consolation in the sense of a dissolving of the pain but, instead, requires redemption in the pain of questioning that which is question-worthy.


278. The thinking of the history of beyng; the concept


The concept [Begriff] is not the grasp [Griff] of calculation; instead, it is the totality [Inbegriff] as inclusion [Einbegriffensein] in the steadfastness of the interrogation of what is question-worthy.

Concepts are not schemata of things represented, meant, and intended; instead, they are instances of steadfastness in the open domain of the clearing of beyng. More rigorous than all calculative concepts, because more exacting, exacted through the necessity of the plight of the question-worthiness of beyng.

But universal intelligibility and even bindingness? Is not everything here “subjective” and “dispositional”?