XI. The thinking of the history of beyng [285–286]

What is demanded by the essential occurrence, i.e., already by the inceptual twisting free of beyng? What is demanded by the downgoing beginning as the inceptual beginning, if this beginning appropriates a thinking? And what is this thinking supposed to do?

Teach, or inventively think?

If teach, then to give historiological instruction to present at hand human beings through historiologically conceptual information about what was thinkable and what was thought in previous times?

If inventively think, then first of all by interrogating the questionworthiness of beyng. Such questioning displaces for the first time into the still-ungrasped truth of beyng.

If inventive thinking has become necessary, then there arises the other either-or:

inventive thinking in recollection of the first beginning, or

inventive thinking in downgoing recollection as thinking ahead.

Recollection of the first beginning inventively thinks the emergent beginning as this unique one; it thinks the beginning of the “West” and, concomitantly, thinks in a historical way the advancement of the first beginning into metaphysics, thinks the consummation of the latter, and ponders its demise.

The downgoing recollection inventively thinks the inceptuality of the beginning, inventively thinks the concealment and its intimacy. The thinking of this recollection is an abandoning of the differentiation, indeed is even the twisting free of beyng into the pure beginning. The course of this thinking proceeds in the transition out of metaphysics into the knowledge of the history of beyng, for which even beyng comes to recollection in the intimacy of the event.

If the downgoing recollection has become necessary, then there arises the inceptual either-or:

thinking in advance (downgoing recollection) as preparation for the poetry appropriate to the history of beyng at the moment of the transition (Hölderlin) , or

thinking in advance as thoughtful imageless saying of the event in the sense of the thoughtful grounding of Da-sein out of the disposition of the attunement of Da-sein, an attunement which disposes Da-sein toward thanking and so first lets Da-sein essentially occur pliantly and ordains Da-sein to its essence.

What is to be done—can that ever, out of inceptual necessity, be broken down into an either and an or? Must not rather both the one as well as the other first be accomplished? Which member of the