or anyone calling themselves a philosopher might require to be simply recited and applied.
Above all, however, we shall never have comprehended these concepts [Begriffe] and their conceptual rigor unless we have first been gripped [ergriffen]3 by whatever they are supposed to comprehend. The fundamental concern of philosophizing pertains to such being gripped, to awakening and planting it. All such being gripped, however, comes from and remains in an attunement [Stimmung]. To the extent that conceptual comprehending and philosophizing is not some arbitrary enterprise alongside others, but happens in the ground [Grunde] of human Dasein, the attunements out of which our being gripped philosophically and our philosophical comprehension arise are always necessarily fundamental attunements [Grundstimmungen] of Dasein. They are of the kind that constantly, essentially, and thoroughly attune human beings, without human beings necessarily always recognizing them as such. Philosophy in each case happens in a fundamental attunement. Conceptual philosophical comprehension is grounded in our being gripped, and this is grounded in a fundamental attunement. Does not Novalis ultimately mean something like this when he calls philosophy a homesickness? Then this poet's word would not be at all deceptive, if only we extract what is essential from it.
And yet, what we have gained from all this is certainly not some definition of metaphysics, but something else. We saw that in our initial attempts to characterize metaphysics we were brought back time and again from all our detours and forced to grasp metaphysics in terms of itself. Even as we did so, metaphysics withdrew from us. Yet to where did it draw us? Metaphysics drew itself back and draws itself back into the obscurity of the essence of man. Our question: What is metaphysics? has transformed itself into the question: What is man?
Certainly we have found no answer to this either. On the contrary, man himself has become more enigmatic for us. We ask anew: What is man? A transition, a direction, a storm sweeping over our planet, a recurrence or a vexation for the gods? We do not know. Yet we have seen that in the essence of this mysterious being, philosophy happens.
3. [Tr: A play on cognates of Griff and greifen features throughout the course, and is difficult to render adequately in English. The noun Begriff is standard German for "concept," and is related to the verbs greifen, to "grasp" or "seize" (both literally and figuratively), and begreifen, to "grasp" or "comprehend" (in the mind). In this section, Heidegger stresses the importance of our conceptual thought being "gripped" or "seized" (ergriffen) by being drawn into a fundamental attunement; in §3, he will refer to philosophical concepts (Begriffe) as Inbegriffe, "comprehensive" or "inclusive" concepts (the Inbegriff normally means the quintessence or epitome of something, so that Heidegger's usage also has the sense of "quintessential concept"); in §7, the philosophical concept or Begriff is described as an "attack" (Angriff) upon man. In all these usages, the notion of being gripped, seized, or taken hold of is central.]