§4 [15-17]

our philosophizing here and now in the comportment of listeners and in the comportment of the lecturer; [3.] The ambiguity of philosophical truth as such.

We are not discussing this ambiguity of philosophy in order to develop a psychology of philosophizing, but in order to clarify the fundamental orientation demanded of us, so that we may let ourselves be guided by greater perspicacity in the coming discussions and leave false expectations aside, be they too high or too low.

§ 4. The ambiguity in philosophizing in general: the uncertainty as to whether or not philosophy is science or the proclamation of a worldview.

We already have a rudimentary awareness that philosophy presents itself as and looks like a science, and yet is not. Philosophy presents itself as the proclamation of a worldview and likewise is not this. These two kinds of semblance, of looking like . . . , are allied, and it is through this that the ambiguousness first becomes obtrusive. If philosophy appears in the semblance of science, then we are also referred to a world view. Philosophy looks like the scientific grounding and presentation of a worldview, and yet is something else.

This dual semblance of being a science and worldview brings about a constant insecurity in philosophy. On the one hand, it seems as though one could not furnish philosophy with enough scientific knowledge and experience—and yet this 'never enough' of scientific knowledge is always too much at the decisive moment. On the other hand, philosophy—so it seems at first—demands that its knowledge be practically applied, as it were, and transformed into factical life. Yet it is always evident too that this moral concern remains superficial to philosophizing. It looks as though creative thinking and moral concern with a worldview could be welded together to produce philosophy. Because philosophy is for the most part familiar only in this ambiguous double face as science and as proclamation of a worldview, one tries to reproduce this double face in order to be completely true to it. This then produces those hybrids which, without marrow, bones, or blood, eke out a literary existence [Dasein]. In this way a scientific treatise arises with moralising directives added on or strewn throughout it. Or else what arises is more or less a good sermon using scientific expressions and forms of thought. Both can look like philosophy, although neither is. Or the converse may happen: something may present itself as a strictly scientific treatise, dry, heavy, without any moralising resonance or any hint of worldview, mere science—and yet it is laden with philosophy through and through. Or a private conversation may take place without

Martin Heidegger (GA 29/30) The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics