in its setting [Stelle], its situation is supposed to be determined. Yet we ourselves are not at all concerned, let alone affected by this world-historical determination of where we are, by the settling of accounts with our culture. On the contrary, the whole affair is something sensational, and this always means an unconceded, yet once again illusory appeasement, albeit of a merely literary and characteristically short-lived kind. This whole approach of cultural diagnosis, which is non-binding and is interesting for just this reason, then becomes even more exciting by being developed and reconstituted, whether explicitly or not, into prognosis. Is there anyone who does not wish to know what is coming, so that they can prepare themselves for it, so as to be less burdened, less preoccupied and affected by the present! These world-historical diagnoses and prognoses of culture do not involve us, they do not attack us. On the contrary, they release us from ourselves and present us to ourselves in a world-historical situation and role. These diagnoses and prognoses of culture are the typical marks of what is called 'philosophy of culture' and is now making an impact in many weaker or even more fantastic variations. This philosophy of culture does not grasp us in our contemporary situation, but at best sees only what is contemporary, yet a contemporaneity which is entirely without us, which is nothing other than what belongs to the eternal yesterday. We have deliberately characterized these interpretations of our situation using foreign words: diagnosis, prognosis [Diagnose, Prognose], because their essence does not grow out of anything original. They lead a literary existence-albeit one that is by no means accidental.

If, however, philosophy of culture in its interpretation of our contemporary situation precisely fails to take hold of us or even grip us, then we would be mistaken if, in the considerations we made, we thought that in order to grasp our fundamental attunement we first had to be certain of our situation in this way.

It could, however, be said that perhaps it is only this particular kind of interpretation of our situation that is inadequate-a claim for which, moreover, we would first require evidence, something that we have so far not provided as such. In any case we will need some kind of pointers to let us see where we now stand. Culture, surely, is precisely the expression of our soul-indeed, it is a widespread opinion today that both culture and man in culture can only be properly and philosophically comprehended through the idea of expression or symbol. We have today a philosophy of culture concerned with expression, With symbol, with symbolic forms. Man as soul and spirit, coming to expression in forms that bear an intrinsic meaning and which, on the basis of this meaning, give a sense to existence [Dasein] as it expresses itself: this, roughly speaking, is the schema of contemporary philosophy of culture. Here too almost everything is correct, right down to the essential. Yet we must ask anew: Is this view of man an essential one? What is happening in these interpretations,