indication and prefiguring of the originary depth of the full essence of boredom. In order to clarify this direction we must now explicitly characterize and sum up how the second form of boredom becomes more profound with respect to the first.
In our provisional contrasting of the two forms of boredom we pointed on several occasions to a distinction readily visible at first sight, namely their different relationship to time. In the second form we leave ourselves time. The whole situation is determined by this. In the first, on the other hand, we are oppressed by the dragging of time, i.e., here we have no time, here we do not want to lose time unnecessarily. The initial result of this is that this first situation is indeed basically the more serious; we do not wish to lose any time, i.e., we wish to lose none of our time. The boring situation is also provoked by the fact that we are concerned and worried about our time and thereby about ourselves. In the second form, by contrast, we ultimately waste time and leave our self standing. The first situation is therefore of greater intensity and more serious in contrast to the second, less serious, frivolous one. The more profound boredom must accordingly correspond to the more intense situation. For only where the intensity is higher is there depth, and vice-versa. Therefore it will not do to take the second form of boredom as the more profound form without further ado--especially since the distinction now noted is a distinction with respect to their relationship to time, and time itself somehow constitutes the concealed essence of boredom.
In the face of this difficulty, which imposes itself of its own accord, we must indeed initially hold fast to the fact that the distinction exposed earlier between the two forms of boredom (with respect to the second form of boredom being essentially anchored in Dasein as such) resulted from boredom and its structure. In the face of this distinction which lies in the matter itself it can be of no consequence that the situation in the first form, as a situation, is perhaps of greater intensity than that in the second form. Certainly-in both cases the kind of situation is not accidental to the character of the boredom involved. Thus we cannot pass by an explicit question and decision: How do things stand concerning the two situations and their relationship to time? Does our not having any time and not wanting to take time in the first form point to a more serious situation and one of greater intensity in contrast to having time and wasting time in the second? With respect to the first form the question is surely: Why do we have no time? To what extent do we not wish to lose any time? Because we need it and wish to use it. For what? For our everyday occupations, to which we have long since become enslaved. We have no time because we ourselves cannot keep from joining in everything that is going on. This not having any time is ultimately a greater being lost of the self than that wasting time which leaves itself time. Perhaps there lies in this having time a far greater balance and thereby security of Dasein-a being-alongside-oneself [Bei-sich-selbst]