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that at least has an intimation that what is essential in Dasein cannot be forcibly brought about by any busyness or mad rush-which certainly does not exclude, but perhaps precisely necessitates that we are nonetheless bored with things in this very situation where we leave ourselves time. This having time and having no time is essentially ambiguous. The 'having no time' that looks like the most rigorous seriousness is perhaps the way in which we are most lost in the banalities of Dasein.

It thereby becomes manifest that it is not at all so easy to contrast these forms of boredom with one another, and that strangely interwoven perspectives open up here which we shall not pursue any further at this point. For us, only this much is clear: it is impossible to infer straightforwardly a more serious, more profound Dasein from not having time, or to infer a less serious, superficial Dasein from leaving oneself time. It remains that the way in which boredom becomes more profound can be read off only from the specific constitution of boredom itself in each case.

We shall now attempt to record provisionally these moments of distinction with respect to depth in a list of specific points; provisionally because we are not at all sure whether what we have achieved hitherto has as yet made the full essence of boredom transparent for us.

The investigation thus far has provided us with seven points by which to characterize, by way of comparison, the distinctions with respect to depth, and in listing these points we shall simultaneously provide a summary of our interpretation thus far. (In what follows, the two forms of boredom, becoming bored by ... and being bored with ... , are designated by I and II respectively in the list of seven points).

[1.] With respect to the structural moment of being left empty:

In I, we have merely the absence of any fullness for an emptiness that is at hand;

in II, the emptiness first forming itself

[2.] With respect to the structural moment of being held in limbo:

In I, we have a being detained by whatever is dragging in a time we somehow need;

in II, not being released and being set in place by standing time as our self that has been left behind.

[3.] With reference to boredom in relation to the situation:

In I, we have a being bound and stuck fast to the particular situation which is limited by extrinsic circumstances;

in II, not being bound to the particular happenings unfolding in the situation.

This third, general distinction is explained in greater detail by the next two points, 4 and 5.

[4.] In I , in the person who is bored there is the attempt, conspicuous to oneself,