boredom and tried to grasp them under seven points. In the first and second points we characterized the structural moments of boredom: being left empty and being held in limbo. In the third, we determined the specific situation-relatedness of boredom. In the fourth and fifth, we characterized the specific kinds of passing the time that accompany boredom in each case, and how they relate to one another. In the sixth point, we tried to establish a distinction in the range of oscillation of the two forms of boredom. Finally, we specified the provenance and specific proximity of boredom to the ground of Dasein in each case. In this final, decisive, all-embracing respect we saw that the first form of becoming bored by something comes to meet us from the outside as it were, while the second points to the fact that boredom arises out of Dasein itself.
By establishing a distinction in depth we have also already indicated the direction in which boredom becomes more profound, though this is all we have done. We have not yet penetrated into the depths of its very essence.
Must we stop at this mere preliminary indication of the depth of its essence? In other words, can we now merely draw an indirect conclusion and infer further what the concealed depths of boredom might look like? Evidently we have certain possibilities of doing so. For we can see that the more profound it becomes, the more completely boredom is rooted in time-in the time that we ourselves are. Accordingly, we must as it were be able to construct profound boredom out of the essence of time conceived more profoundly. This is a clear task and one which can be performed-provided that we understand time itself in its essential depths. Yet we know precisely nothing concerning this. What we wish to do is the converse of this-as already emphasized repeatedly namely to press forward to the essence of time through our interpretation of the essence of boredom. We do not wish to do so on account of any particular obstinacy on our part, but because the essence of time cannot be illuminated at all in any other way, i.e., it cannot be illuminated by our simply speculating about time and thinking up another concept of time. This is certainly not to say that the interpretation of boredom is the only way toward understanding original temporality. Presumably, however, it is one way, such as it must be, i.e., such a way as does not regard time as something we find within our consciousness or as a subjective form. It is a path on which, even before setting out and going along it, we have already comprehended that precisely the essence of consciousness and the essence of subjectivity must be put into question in advance in order to remove the chief obstacle preventing our access to original time. We must therefore take careful note that the conception of man as consciousness, as subject, as person, as a rational being, and our concept of each of these: of consciousness, subject, I, and person, must be put in question. And what must be put in question is not merely our access to consciousness in the Cartesian sense of the method of grasping consciousness,