§31 [206-207]

of the two structural moments and their unity: being left empty and being held in limbo. We now know from our interpretation of the first and second forms of boredom that these structural moments are in each case transformed, that they are not rigid standards, not a fixed framework that we can lay at the basis of every form of boredom, but merely directives for catching sight of its proper essence in each specific case and determining it on its own terms, while running the risk that the form of being left empty and being held in limbo will now become transformed anew in this third case.

a) Being left empty as Dasein's being delivered over to beings'
telling refusal of themselves as a whole.

In this 'it is boring for one' we are not seeking to fill a particular emptiness one that is at hand and that has arisen through a particular situation-by means of a particular being that is accessible in a particular situation. We are not concerned with filling a particular emptiness that arises for us out of particular circumstances; for instance, out of our arriving too early at the station. Here the emptiness is not the lack of any particular fulfilment. Nor is this emptiness a self-forming of that emptiness in which one's own proper self is left standing, in a being left behind which is accompanied by letting oneself go, and which, in itself, is indeed a letting oneself go with whatever offers itself. In this 'it is boring for one' we find no such letting oneself go with the particular beings in a particular situation, and yet in this 'it is boring for one' precisely the emptiness and being left empty are quite unambiguous and straightforward. But what emptiness is this, when we are not explicitly seeking any particular fulfilment and do not even leave our own self behind in this being left empty? What emptiness is it, when we do not become bored by particular beings, and are not bored ourselves either, as this particular person? It is an emptiness precisely where, as this person in each case, we want nothing from the particular beings in the contingent situation as these very beings. Yet the fact that precisely here we want nothing is already due to the boredom. For with this 'it is boring for one' we are not merely relieved of our everyday personality, somehow distant and alien to it, but simultaneously also elevated beyond the particular situation in each case and beyond the specific beings surrounding us there. The whole situation and we ourselves as this individual subject are thereby indifferent, indeed this boredom does not even let it get to the point where such things are of any particular worth to us. Instead it makes everything of equally great and equally little worth. What is this 'everything', and to what extent does it become the same for us? This boredom takes us precisely back to the point where we do not in the first place seek out this or that being for ourselves in this particular situation; it takes us back to the point where all and everything appears indifferent to us.

Martin Heidegger (GA 29/30) The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics

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