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while we are bored, or even wanting to explain it. Accordingly, we are not opposed to this boredom in any passing the time that seeks to drive it away, nor do we really evade it, but we experience a peculiar compulsion in it, a compulsion to listen to what it has to tell us. We experience our being compelled to enter the peculiar truth or manifestness that lies in this attunement as in every attunement in general. Yet from this association of passing the time with boredom, important though it may be in each case, we do not yet penetrate into the inner essence of the third form. We can succeed in this only if we consider the structural moments of being left empty and being held in limbo. Certainly, at the outset of the investigation these moments must be taken as completely non-binding, at the risk of their becoming transformed. Being left empty is here no longer the absence of a particular satisfaction through being occupied with something-we do not seek such a thing at all. Nor is it leaving one's own self standing, in the face of which we let ourselves go with something in which we become immersed. And yet all beings, not just this one or that one, stand in a strange indifference, not as though all beings were lined up in sequence, but all at once.

Yet, can we then still speak of a being left empty when we ourselves after all belong to these things that have become indifferent? If we ourselves belong to these things that have become indifferent, then it is surely a matter of indifference whether we are satisfied or left empty. After all, being left empty is always possible only where there is some claim to being fulfilled, where the necessity of a fullness exists; it is not the indifference of emptiness. Yet if beings as a whole stand in an indifference, then everything indeed, even this being left empty, is indifferent, i.e., impossible. Certainly, and it is for precisely this reason that we say: it is boring for one; not for me as me, but for one, and that means for one as this particular Da-sein. Yet this determinacy of Dasein is not connected to the petty I-ness that is familiar to us. The indifference of beings as a whole manifests itself for Da-sein, but for Da-sein as such. This means that through this boredom Dasein finds itself set in place precisely before beings as a whole, to the extent that in this boredom the beings that surround us offer us no further possibility of acting and no further possibility of our doing anything. There is a telling refusal on the part of beings as a whole with respect to these possibilities. There is a telling refusal on the part of beings for a Dasein that, as such, in the midst of these beings as a whole, comports itself toward them-toward them, toward those beings as a whole and their now telling refusal-and must comport itself toward them, if it is indeed to be what it is. Dasein thus finds itself delivered over to beings' telling refusal of themselves as a whole.

Being left empty in this third form of boredom is Dasein's being delivered over to beings' telling refusal of themselves as a whole. In this 'it is boring for one' we find ourselves-as Dasein-somehow left entirely in the lurch, not