Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics [216-217]

at all in a position to let this attunement 'it is boring for one' oscillate in us over the entire expanse of its oscillation. The telling announcement that points toward that which properly makes Dasein possible in its possibility impels us toward the singular extremity [Spitze] of whatever originarily makes possible. It is boring for one. Being held in limbo is rendered more extreme in a singular manner in the direction of whatever originarily makes Dasein possible in the midst of those beings thus manifest as a whole, and this corresponds to the full expanse of beings in their telling refusal of themselves as a whole, those beings in whose midst we find ourselves disposed. It is boring for one. To such coming to be left in the lurch by beings' telling refusal of themselves as a whole there simultaneously belongs our being impelled toward this utmost extremity that properly makes possible Dasein as such. We have thereby determined the specific being held in limbo of the third form: being impelled toward the originary making-possible of Dasein as such.

Both, this complete expanse of beings in their telling refusal as a whole, and the singular extremity of whatever makes Dasein as such possible-both at the same time in their own unity become manifest as what is at work in Dasein whenever it must tell itself: It is boring for one. Expanding into the enveloping limit of beings as a whole in the manner of intensifying the extremity of Dasein in the direction of what is originarily singular in whatever makes Dasein itself possible-this is the being bored, the boredom that we mean when we say that it is boring for one. This leaving empty that takes us into an expanse together with a holding us in limbo that intensifies extremity is the originary manner in which the attunement that we call boredom attunes us.

§32. The temporal character of profound boredom.

We have now elaborated both structural moments of the third form of boredom and made them visible in their structural unity. We were able to accomplish this without reference to time. Neither time as it drags nor the standing time we leave ourselves in being bored plays any role here. Above all, it is quite evident in this 'it is boring for one' that the clock does not play any part. Looking at the clock here loses all meaning. Yet even taking time or having no time are without any significance here. And yet, however far removed we remain in this boredom from using the clock at all, it is also a matter of indifference whether precisely now when it is boring for one we have time or have no time. However unconcerned we are about time in whatever way-we are just as close to it, and in this 'it is boring for one' we move just as deeply within the essence of time. For reasons that will shortly come to light, we must restrict ourselves for now merely to indicating what is time-like in this third

Martin Heidegger (GA 29/30) The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics

Page generated by FundaSteller.EXE