being left empty as such and thereby the being held in limbo pertaining to it are possible in terms of the essence of time and it alone.
It is boring for one. This entails being left empty and being delivered over to beings' telling refusal of themselves as a whole. In such an attunement, Dasein is in no way able to obtain anything from beings as a whole. Beings as a whole withdraw, yet not at all in such a way that Dasein is left alone. Beings as a whole withdraw, this means: Dasein is indeed there in the midst of beings as a whole, has them around, above, and within itself, yet cannot give way to this withdrawal. It cannot-the attunement attunes in such a way that the Dasein which is thus attuned can no longer bring itself to expect anything from beings as a whole in any respect, because there is not even anything enticing about beings any more. They withdraw as a whole. Yet this withdrawal [Entzug] of beings which announces itself in them is possible only if Dasein as such can no longer go along with them, only if it is entranced as Da-sein, and indeed as a whole. Precisely this temporal horizon, therefore, which holds beings as a whole open and makes them accessible in general as such, must simultaneously bind Dasein to itself and entrance it. It is boring for one. This attunement in which Dasein is everywhere and yet may be nowhere has its own peculiar feature of entrancement. What entrances is nothing other than the temporal horizon. Time entrances [bannt] Dasein, not as the time which has remained standing as distinct from flowing, but rather the time beyond such flowing and its standing, the time which in each case Dasein itself as a whole is. This whole time entrances as a horizon. Entranced by time, Dasein cannot find its way to those beings that announce themselves in the telling refusal of themselves as a whole precisely within this horizon of entrancing time.
It is boring for one. Entranced, and yet accustomed to being acquainted and concerned only with beings and indeed with this or that being in each case, Dasein finds nothing, in the telling refusal of these beings as a whole, which could "explain" this entrancement to it. It is from here that there stirs what is enigmatic and concealed in the power that envelops us in this 'it is boring for one'. For in this attunement, after all, we do not usually philosophize about boredom or in boredom, rather-it is boring for one. Instead, we leave this concealed entrancement its power.
It thus becomes apparent that being left empty is possible only as our being entranced by the temporal horizon as such, in which entrancement of Dasein beings can withdraw from Dasein and refuse themselves to Dasein. For the Dasein that is entranced, the emptiness of this telling refusal as a whole arises on the side of beings. This entrancement of Dasein must—and this is the peculiar sense of this attunement—precisely leave such emptiness its undiminished leeway and space in which to play. What is entrancing in this attunement is not the determinate time-point at which the specific boredom arises; for this