such, namely time, announces and tells of as something in fact refused; what it precisely holds before us as something that has apparently vanished; what it gives to be known and properly makes possible as something possible and only as this, as something that can be given to be free; what it gives to be free in its telling announcing—is nothing less than the freedom of Dasein as such. For this freedom of Dasein only is in Dasein's freeing itself The self-liberation of Dasein, however, only happens in each case if Dasein resolutely discloses [sich entschließt] itself to itself, i.e., discloses itself [sich erschließt] for itself as Da-sein. To the extent, however, that Dasein finds itself disposed in the midst of beings, as in each case this Dasein with this its time in the unity of its threefold perspective, Dasein can resolutely disclose itself only if it brings these beings together into an extremity, only if it resolutely discloses itself for action here and now in this essential respect and in this chosen and essential possibility of its self. This resolute self-disclosure of Dasein to itself, however, namely in each case to be in the midst of beings what it is given to be in its determinateness—this resolute self-disclosure is the moment of vision [Augenblick]. Why? Dasein is not something present at hand alongside other things, but is set in the midst of beings through the manifestness of the full temporal horizon. As Dasein it always already maintains itself in this threefold perspective. As that which rests in time it only is what it can be if in each case at its time—and that simultaneously means in each case here and now, with reference to these beings that are precisely thus manifest—it is there [da], that is, opens itself up [sich aufschließt] in its manifestness, that is, resolutely discloses itself. Only in the resolute self-disclosure of Dasein to itself, in the moment of vision, does it make use of that which properly makes it possible, namely time as the moment of vision itself. The moment of vision is nothing other than the look of resolute disclosedness [Blick der Entschlossenheit] in which the full situation of an action opens itself and keeps itself open. What time as entrancing accordingly keeps to itself, and in keeping it to itself simultaneously announces and tells of as something that can be given to be free, giving it to be known as possibility, is something of that time itself; it is that which makes possible, which that time itself and it alone can be: the moment of vision. Dasein's being impelled into the extremity of that which properly makes possible is a being impelled through entrancing time into that time itself, into its proper essence, i.e., toward the moment of vision as the fundamental possibility of Dasein's existence proper.
It is boring for one. In this, the time that entrances as a whole announces and tells of itself as that which is to be ruptured and can be ruptured solely in the moment of vision in which time itself, as that which properly makes Dasein possible in its actions, is at work. Thus we see, albeit only roughly, that on the basis of this entrancement of the temporal horizon as such and of the moment of vision that is also announced in this telling refusal, precisely this