intimated as what could and ought to be given to be free in Dasein's proper essence as that which makes it most intrinsically possible, yet now in the entrancement of Dasein is not thus given.
To this extent, and only to this extent, the temporal character of this third form of boredom may be illuminated on the path on which we have set out. This means that a limit to our path does now indeed become manifest here; our path becomes more and more difficult because our view ahead is more obscure. Here 'temporal character' does not simply mean that boredom is among other things also determined by time, but means that the full structure of this boredom is made possible through time itself; time itself—which has now become more enigmatic for us when we think of the horizon of time, its expanse, its horizonal function—among other things as entrancement-and finally when we think of the way in which this horizon is connected to what we call moment of vision.
§33. The essential meaning of the word 'boredom ' or 'Langeweile': the lengthening of the while in profound boredom as the expansion of the temporal horizon and the vanishing of the extremity of a moment of vision.
And yet—precisely now, starting from our interpretation of this third form of boredom, we can give the word boredom, 'Langeweile', a more essential meaning. In boredom, Langeweile, the while [Weile] becomes long [lang]. Which while? Any short while? No, but rather that while whilst Dasein is as such, the while that measures out that tarrying awhile [Verweilen] which is allotted to Dasein as such, i.e., the while whilst it is to be in the midst of these beings, in confrontation with them and thus with itself. It is this whole while—and yet a short while; and so every Dasein in turn is a short while. This while of Dasein, i.e., its own time, is at first and for the most part concealed from Dasein, as what it simply uses up as it were, or else makes itself aware of in an inappropriate manner when it reckons with this while, calculates it in advance for itself, just as though Dasein itself were a business. In boredom, and indeed especially in this form when 'one is bored', this while of Dasein becomes long. This does not mean that the short time of Dasein appears longer. Human Dasein can become essential in terms of the brevity of objective time, and it can remain inessential even if it reaches seventy years old or more. With this time what is at issue is not the time of the clock or chronology, but the lengthening or shortening of time proper. For what is at issue is fundamentally not the quantitative measure of the shortness or length of endurance in which a Dasein is. That the while becomes long means that the horizon of whiling—which at first and for the most part shows itself to us, if at all, as that of a present, and even