then more as what is now and today-expands itself into the entire expanse of the temporality of Dasein. This lengthening of the while manifests the while of Dasein in its indeterminacy that is never absolutely determinable. This indeterminacy takes Dasein captive, yet in such a way that in the whole expansive and expanded expanse it can grasp nothing except the mere fact that it remains entranced by and toward this expanse. The lengthening of the while is the expansion of the temporal horizon, whose expansion does not bring Dasein liberation or unburden it, but precisely the converse in oppressing it with its expanse. In this expanse of time it oppresses Dasein and thus includes in itself a peculiar indication of its shortness.
The lengthening is a vanishing of the shortness of the while. Yet just as with length, we are not thinking shortness as quantitatively short duration, rather the vanishing of shortness is the vanishing of the sharpness and extremity of a moment of vision pertaining to action and existence that is in each case determinate. This vanishing of this shortness, of the extreme nature of a moment of vision, in the lengthening of the while precisely does not make the moment of vision vanish, however; rather only the possibility vanishes here, whereby the possibility of whatever is possible is precisely intensified. In vanishing, the moment of vision still presses itself upon us as that which is properly and tellingly refused in time's entrancing, as the properly authentic possibility of that which makes possible the existence of Dasein. We thereby see how in boredom this expanse and shortness, both rooted in time, spring in turn in their peculiar connectedness from the specific way in which the temporality of Dasein is, or rather temporalizes itself.
§34. Summary 'definition' of profound boredom as a more incisive directive for interpreting boredom and as preparation for the question concerning a particular profound boredom in our contemporary Dasein.
Thus we may say, in summarizing our whole analysis at the stage we have now arrived at: Boredom is the entrancement of the temporal horizon, an entrancement which lets the moment of vision belonging to temporality vanish. In thus letting it vanish, boredom impels entranced Dasein into the moment of vision as the properly authentic possibility of its existence, an existence only possible in the midst of beings as a whole, and within the horizon of entrancement, their telling refusal of themselves as a whole.
This intrinsic structure of the 'it is boring for one' can thus be formally expressed in a definition. Yet even this definition, which has arisen from a more penetrating interpretation, does not tell us much if it is taken as an assertion in which something is supposed to be established, instead of as a