specific kind of drivenness, i.e., a specific inhibition of the same. This inhibition, however, is not related to that which the sucking activity is related to. The driven activity and behaviour of the bee is not governed by any recognition of the presence or absence of that which it is driven to engage with, of that to which its sucking behaviour stands in relation. That means that in sucking at the blossom the bee does not comport itself toward the blossom as something present or not present. We claim that the activity here is terminated through an inhibition (drive and disinhibition). Yet that also means that the activity does not simply cease, rather the drivenness of the capability is redirected into another drive. Instinctual activity is not a recognitive self-directing toward objectively present things, but a behaving. Driven activity is a behaving. This is not to deny that something like a directedness toward scent and honey, a relation toward . . . , does belong to behaviour, but there is no recognitive self-directing toward these things. More precisely, there is no apprehending of honey as something present, but rather a peculiar captivation which is indeed related to the honey. The drive is captivated. In what sense? The continued sucking tells us the answer: it is captivated by the scent and the honey. However, when the sucking is discontinued, the captivation also ceases. Yet this is not the case at all. The instinctual activity is simply redirected toward flying back to the bee hive. This flight back to the hive is just as captivated as was the sucking, it is merely another form of captivation, i.e., another case of the bee's behaviour.
We must content ourselves here with a brief account of how the bee redirects its instinctual sucking into an instinctual impulse to return to the hive, how the bee finds its way back to the hive at all, how it orients itself, as we are accustomed to saying. In the strict sense, there is orientation only where space is disclosed as such, and thus where the possibility of distinguishing different regions and identifiable locations within these regions is also given. We recognize of course that the bee flies through space as it returns home to the hive from the meadow, but the question is whether in behaving in this way the bee opens up a space as space and flies through it as its spatial flight-path. Of course it does, one may say, without initially being able to clarify any further how the bee's traversal of this spatial flight-path is different in kind from the flight-path traversed by a bullet. The problem of animal space, of whether the animal has a space as such space at all, cannot be taken up in isolation. The problem is rather to establish the correct basis and perspective for this question in the first place, to ask after the basis of a universal determination of the essence of animality which will then allow us to inquire into the possible relationship between the animal and its space. Thus we recognize not only the traversal of space here but also the potential to return home, the capacity for returning home. We must now consider this more closely in relation to what follows.