§60 [362-63]

§60. The openness of behaviour and captivation, and what it is that the animal relates itself to.

In order once again to provide a concrete support for this question concerning the openness of behaviour, we return to our first example of the bee which started sucking and then interrupted its sucking. In discussing such behaviour we only got as far as the question of whether or not recognizing the presence of the honey as honey plays a leading part here. Our further examination of the bee's capacity for orienting itself reinforced us in the view that the animal's relationality to other things consists in a kind of being taken, even and indeed precisely where the animal directs itself toward something in its orientation. The task is to clarify such behaviour and animal activity in general even further by bringing out its fundamental character. Yet determining this fundamental character more closely only leads us to the question concerning the openness of captivation and the essence of that for which the captivation of the animal is open.

a) The eliminative character of behaviour.

It is true that we do not wish to pursue the problem concerning the capacity for self-orientation any further at this point. But our attention to this problem has taught us something essential: that the drives of the animal, the particular forms of its behaviour, are not to be taken in isolation; but that on the contrary the totality of instinctual behaviour within which the animal is driven must constantly be borne in mind, even when we appear to be offering an isolated interpretation. The animal's behaviour in relation to the sun does not occur as a form of recognition which is subsequently followed by an appropriate form of action. Rather the animal's captivation by the sun only occurs in and through its instinctual foraging drive. The drives and the ways in which the animal is driven (seeking out food, lying in wait for prey) do not radiate out, as it were, in so many different directions and diverge from one another. On the contrary, each instinctual drive is intrinsically determined by its being driven with respect to the other drives. Instinctual drivenness as being driven from one drive to another holds and drives the animal within a ring which it cannot escape and within which something is open for the animal. Yet while it is certain that all instinctual behaviour is a relating to . . . , it is just as surely the case that in all its behaviour the animal is incapable of ever properly attending to something as such. The animal is encircled [umringt] by this ring [Ring] constituted by the reciprocal drivenness of its drives. Yet we must not determine this inability to attend to something as such in a purely negative manner. What does this inability positively imply for the phenomenon of captivation and its characteristic openness? It is not simply that behaviour never displays this character of attending to . . . . On the contrary,

Martin Heidegger (GA 29/30) The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics