311

to want to point something out to him. The other person in general must in advance take my discourse as having this tendency to point out; only in this way can I deceive him about something. This indicates the problem in interpreting the essence of the λόγος. We must ask: In what is this intrinsic possibility of concealing and revealing grounded? When we have answered this question, we will be able to answer the question: How does that which we designate the 'as'-structure relate to the inner structure of the λόγος? Is the 'as'-structure merely a property of the λόγος, or ultimately something originary: the condition of the possibility of any λόγος in general being what it is?

Before we pursue these questions, let us summarize once more what has been said concerning the λόγος, and at the same time recall our central problem. In all its behaviourally driven activity, the animal is taken by whatever it is relating to in this behaviour. That to which it stands in relation is thus never given to it in its what-being as such: it is not given as what it is and how it is, not as a being. The animal's behaviour is never an apprehending of something as something. Insofar as we address this possibility of taking something as something as characteristic of the phenomenon of world, the 'as'-structure is an essential determination of the structure of world. The 'as' is thereby given as a possible approach to the problem of world. We formally traced the 'as'-structure back to the propositional statement. The propositional statement is a normal form of human discourse, a form which, since the first reflections of the philosophy of antiquity, determined not only the theory of discourse, namely logic, but also the study of grammar. If, therefore, we orient our exposition of the problem of the connection between 'as'-structure and assertion around the λόγος, this is not some arbitrary historical interest, but is intended to lead into the elementary nature of the problem. We are considering the problem of the connection between the 'as' and the λόγος, taking our orientation from what Aristotle says about the λόγος. For ancient reflection reaches its apotheosis in Aristotle. He was the first to establish the correct basis for the problem and interpreted it so extensively that we—if we have the eyes to see—can take from him certain guidelines for our problem. Quite broadly, the λόγος, according to Aristotle, is the possibility of discourse and of speaking in general. From this perspective, it is quite natural for antiquity to take discourse in the broadest sense as an essential moment of man himself, and thereby to define man as ζῷον λόγον ἔχον, a living being that is open for, and can speak out about, that toward which it is open. This is the general character of their conception of the λόγος. The question now is where we are to see the pervasive essence of the λόγος. λόγος σημαντικός is an utterance that inherently gives something meaningful, forms a sphere of understandability. The more far-reaching question is: What does σημαντικός mean? Aristotle says: This event is not a natural occurrence, but something that happens on the basis of an agreement. The essence of agreement consists in the fact that the genesis