a unity as it were. The ground of the possibility of revealing or concealing is this formation of a unity. Wherever there is revealing or concealing, we have λόγος ἀποφαντικός; and wherever we have the latter—belonging to its innermost possibility, lying at the basis of that revealing and concealing—we have "synthesis," assembling, taking together (the positing of a together as such; formation of a unity), ap-prehending [Ver-nehmen] of a together, unity namely of whatever is apprehended. At the basis of the λόγος, there lies an apprehending, νόησις, νοῦς, an apprehending of something—or rather the λόγος, is, in accordance with its essence, this apprehending of ... (cf. σύμβολον above). In accordance with its inner possibility, the λόγος is grounded in νοῦς, ratio in Latin, which is why this comes to be equated with λόγος, because the latter is νοῦς,. The translation of the definition of man as ζῷον λόγον ἔχον by animal rationale also comes from this. In short: An apprehending that forms a unity (the apprehending formation of unity) is the essential ground of the possibility of revealing or concealing, not only of one or the other, but of the 'either/or' and the 'both ... and' of these two possibilities. It is thus the essential ground of each of them as such, such as we find them only in this 'either/or' or 'both ... and'.
The question now is: How does Aristotle ground this thesis, and how does he show that revealing and concealing necessarily demand a σύνθεσις, as the condition of their possibility? σύνθεσις, in short, is the condition of the possibility of ψεῦδος. Thus Aristotle can state directly: τὸ γὰρ ψεῦδος ἐν συνθέσει ἀεί9 Where there is deception (concealment), there we find such apprehending formation of a unity. This is merely what the thesis says. Aristotle immediately grounds this: καὶ γὰρ άν τὸ λευκόν μὴ λευκόν, τὸ μὴ λευκόν συνέθηκεν:10 For if someone says, in such a way that he wants to deceive the other person, that something white is not white, he has already brought the 'not white' into a unity with white. This 'together' must in general be formed in advance in order to be able to say by way of deception that something is not this or that. In principle we may say that in order to point out something in general—whether as it is or as it is not—i.e., in order to be able to reveal or conceal by way of pointing out, whatever is to be pointed out must already be apprehended in advance in the unity of its determinations, in terms of which and in which it can be determined explicitly in its character as such and such. This is why it is already apprehended in advance as this or that. When Aristotle speaks of σύνθεσις in this context, he means what we call the 'as'-structure. This is what he means, though without explicitly penetrating into the dimension of this problem. The 'as'-structure, the prior apprehending of something as something in forming a unity, is the condition of the possibility of truth and
9. Ibid., Γ6, 430b 1f.
10. Ibid., Γ6, 430b 2f.