§72 [456-57]

falsity of the λόγος. I must already have had the blackboard in view as something unitary in order to take apart in a judgement what has been apprehended.

In our first introductory and superficial outline of the 'as' we merely said that it appears wherever the propositional statement appears, which for its part is associated with being true or being false. A connection within the λόγος is now becoming clear, such that the 'as'-structure itself is the condition of the possibility of the λόγος ἀποφαντικός, if the latter is indeed distinguished by ἀληθές and ψεῦδος. The 'as' is not some property of the λόγος, stuck on or grafted onto it, but the reverse: the 'as'-structure for its part is in general the condition of the possibility of this λόγος.

d) The apprehension of something as something in forming
a unity in the affirmative and negative assertion as
a taking together that takes apart (σύνθεσις—διαίρεσις).

We must see things more clearly if we are to make the most of the interpretation of the λόγος we have given so far, oriented toward our particular problem. In Aristotle the 'as' is to be found under the title of σύνθεσις. Yet is this not the same thing as we have already indicated: namely that a relation is thought in the 'as'? We now see, however, that σύνθεσις is not simply a relation in the formal sense in which everything is a relation. The 'as' pertains to a σύνθεσις, to a relating, and specifically to a σύνθεσις νοημάτων, to a connecting of representations, to the apprehending formation of a unity or a unity-forming apprehension. If, however, the 'as'-structure belongs to such a synthesis—although how remains obscure initially—then we can glean something more from this. The συν means a together, a unity, and manifestly one that is not a piecing together, but an originary unity which, earlier than the parts, is a whole. συν—whole—as a whole? The 'as'-structure itself thereby shows an essential connection with the second structure we are asking about here: the 'as a whole'.

We shall let the problem rest. For to begin with, our attempt to ascribe the 'as'-structure to σύνθεσις becomes extremely questionable if we note that Aristotle, immediately after pointing out the connection between ψεῦδος and σύνθεσις, states: ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ διαίρεσιν φάναι πάντα:11 Everything that I have pointed out under the title σύνθεσις, one may also call διαίρεσις, taking apart, i.e., one may conceive of it as this. To begin with we shall elucidate this with an example, borrowing from what Aristotle himself cites: Something white is not white. A prior taking together of white and not white underlies this.

11. Ibid., Γ6, 430b 3f.

Martin Heidegger (GA 29/30) The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics

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