And precisely this taking together is also a taking apart. We can only hold one together with the other if this holding together in itself remains a holding apart. The σύνθεσις νοημάτων is inherently, in itself, also already διαίρεσις. Apprehending is intrinsically a taking together that takes apart. As such it is the essential ground of the possibility of revealing or concealing pertaining to the λόγος, i.e., the λόγος ἀποφαντικός.
Aristotle concisely expresses this structural connection right at the beginning of his treatise on the λόγος ἀποφαντικός in the following way: περὶ γὰρ σύνθεσιν καὶ διαίρεσίν ἐστι τὸ ψεῦδος τε καὶ τὸ ἀληθές.12 The revealing and concealing of discourse as pointing out is to be found only where this apprehending occurs that takes together and takes apart. Furthermore, he states in his Metaphysics:13 Both ἀληθές and ψεῦδος are περὶ σύνθεσιν ... καὶ διαίρεσίν—stand alongside ..., are dependent upon ..., are grounded in taking together and taking apart. For σύνθεσις he also uses the expression συμπλοκή or συνάπτειν. The problem is how it is possible that something, namely human comportment, can in itself simultaneously be a taking together and taking apart, not consecutively, but in accordance with their unitary structure. Unfolding this problem means nothing other than interpreting the essence of the 'as', and thereby an essential component of world in general.
We should take careful note of the fact that every ἀληθεύειν of the λόγος ἀποφαντικός is grounded upon σύνθεσις and διαίρεσις, and likewise every ψεύδεσθαι. This insight is of far-reaching significance not merely for our concrete problem in general, but also for interpreting the whole doctrine of λόγος in Aristotle (cf. De Interpretatione, Chapter 5). With respect to its fundamental function, Aristotle also refers to the λόγος ἀποφαντικός as ἀπόφασις for short-pointing out something in and according to what it is or is not (De Interpretatione, Chapter 5, 17a 20). The ἀπλῆ ἀπόφανσις accordingly has two fundamental forms: it is either ἀπόφανσις τινος κατά τινος or ἀπόφανσις τινος ἀπό τινος φασις, the λόγος, is accordingly κατάφασις or ἀπόφασις (De Interpretatione, Chapter 5, 17a 23—Chapter 6,a 26). That which points out is either a pointing out that points toward or a pointing out that points away: The board is black, the board is not red. The pointing out can be such as to ascribe something to whatever the pointing out is concerned with, or such as to deny it something in pointing it out, i.e., to point something away from it: the board is not red. In each case there occurs a pointing out of the board as such, and this pointing out is in each case a revealing, a true pointing out. The board is not black, the board is red: here too we have a 'toward' and 'away', in each case a tendency to point out, in each case concealing, false. We can see from this that if every true and every false λόγος can be either κατάφασις or ἀπόφασις, and if every true and every false
12. Aristotelis Organon, ibid. Hermeneutica (de interpretatione), Chap. 1, 16a 12f.
13. Aristotelis Metaphysica, ibid., E4, 1027b 19.