therefore refer to an inquiring back into the ground of the inner possibility, or, as we also say for short, inquiring back into this ground in the sense of discovering the ground. Investigating the origin does not mean grounding in the sense of factical proving, but rather an inquiring into the essential origin, letting something spring from the ground of its essence, discovering the ground in the sense of pointing out the ground of the possibility of the structure as a whole. We are inquiring back into the ground of the inner possibility of the λόγος. We are thereby inquiring into the dimension of what makes it intrinsically possible, the dimension of its essential origin. We must therefore already be acquainted with this originary dimension in advance. How are we to find it? Evidently we can only do so by catching sight of the whole structure of the λόγος and looking to see what its intrinsic and essential construction itself points to as that which grounds it and embraces it.
Accordingly, we are asking where the λόγος in general stands. We have to say that it is an essential manner of comportment belonging to man. We must therefore ask after the ground of the inner possibility of the λόγος in terms of the concealed essence of man. Yet here too we are not to proceed in such a way as to now acquire a definition of the essence of man from somewhere and apply it; on the contrary, we must proceed from the very structure of the λόγος correctly understood and, by going back to the ground of its possibility that it points toward, first let it be said how things stand concerning the essence of man. All we know is that we must proceed from the unitary structure of the λόγος back into the essence of man. Nothing has been decided concerning this essence. All we have is the thesis: man is world-forming, a thesis we appeal to as a statement of essence, of the same character as the thesis that the animal is poor in world. This thesis, however, must not be applied at this stage; rather it is precisely a matter of unfolding it and grounding it as a problem. What we here call world-formation is ultimately also the very ground of the inner possibility of the λόγος. Whether it is this, and above all what it is, is something we do not yet know. In the end we shall come to comprehend from the essence of world-formation what Aristotle hits upon as the ground of the possibility of the λόγος ἀποφαντικός, namely apprehending in its peculiar structure of σύνθεσις-διαίρεσις, which we linked to the 'as'-structure. Yet if we recall correctly, it is not only via the thesis 'man is world-forming' that we know something of man, for in the first part of the lecture course we developed a fundamental attunement of man within which we were able to attain an essential insight into the Dasein of man in general. Now that we are inquiring back into the ground of the inner possibility of assertion, the question is whether we will not ultimately be led back into that dimension which—from a quite different perspective and in a very rich manner-the interpretation of boredom as a fundamental attunement of Dasein has already led us to.