as to ask what makes possible its inner essence, namely its ability to allow the 'either/or' of being true or being false, will we be assured of being able to really discover the ground of the λόγος in its essential structure.
c) Being free, pre-logical being open for beings as such and
holding oneself toward the binding character of things as the
ground of the possibility of assertion.
The λόγος in the form of the λόγος ἀποφαντικός is the ability for a comportment that points beings out, whether in the manner of revealing (true) or concealing (false). Such ability is possible only as this ability if it is grounded in being free for beings as such. It is upon this that being free in that pointing out that points toward and away is grounded, and this being free in ... can then unfold as being free for revealing or concealing (truth or falsity). In short, the λόγος ἀποφαντικός as assertion is possible only where there is freedom. Within the particular comportment and ability that can spring from freedom and with which we are now solely concerned, i.e., in the phenomenon of pointing out, something like conforming to ... and being bound to ... is possible such that what this binding binds itself to, namely beings, are announced in their binding character. And this is possible only if there is an underlying freedom that is structurally articulated in this way, and for its part itself articulates. Revealing and concealing of λόγος, truth and being false, truth or falsity—the possibility of both—is to be found only where there is freedom, and only where there is freedom do we find the possibility of something having a binding character. It is precisely possibility and the character of ability pertaining to the λόγος whose ground we wish to discover. When we say that this ability to point out is grounded in being free for beings as such, this entails that the λόγος does not first produce a relation toward beings as such, but for its part is grounded in such a relation. In each of its forms it always makes use of such a relation in a particular way. How? The λόγος can point out beings as they are, and in such pointing out point toward whatever pertains to those beings or direct away whatever does not pertain to them, only if it already has the possibility in general of measuring this pointing out and whether it suitably conforms to those beings. However, in order to be able to decide about the conformity or nonconformity of whatever the λόγος says in pointing out, or more precisely, in order to be able to comport himself in general within this 'either/or', man in his propositional discourse must have leeway [Spielraum] in advance for the comparative to-and-fro of the 'either/or', of truth or falsity. He must have leeway within which those beings that assertion is to be about are themselves manifest. This entails the essential point that not only does the λόγος ἀποφαντικός—as we have shown above—not produce