our relation to beings, it does not even produce this manifestness of beings. It always already merely makes use of both that relation and this manifestness in order to fulfil its potential as a revealing or concealing that points out.
However, in talking about revealing and concealing, are we not saying that the λόγος itself as such makes manifest, is true-indeed, in accordance with general opinion, is it not the proper and sole place of truth? Certainly truth or the possibility of the 'either/or' lies in the λόγος, but this possible being true or revealing that belongs to it, the λόγος, is not an originary being true, i.e., not that making manifest and revealing through which beings as such lie open for us in general and are unconcealed in themselves. It is not, and indeed never the case that an assertion as such—however true it might be—could ever primarily reveal beings as such. To take an example: in making the true assertion 'The board is black', this being that we call a board does not first become manifest to us in the way that it is through this true statement as such, as though the assertion as such were capable of opening up to us, as it were, this being that was previously closed off. The assertion-although it opens up in its own way—never brings us primarily and in general before those beings that are revealed. Rather the converse is the case: the blackboard must already have become manifest to us as such a being in order for us to assert something about it in pointing out. The λόγος ἀποφαντικός merely takes apart [legt ... auseinander], in the assertion, what is already manifest. It does not, however, first form the manifestness of beings in general. There does indeed lie a being true or being false in the assertion—indeed the assertion is even the form in which being true and being false are commonly expressed, passed on, and communicated. Yet this does not at all entail that propositional truth is the fundamental form of truth. Certainly, in order to see this we need to take a deeper look into the essence of truth, something we shall achieve in the course of our investigation. If we recoil from this task and stick from the outset to some dogmatic opinion about what 'true' is supposed to mean, then it can indeed be irrefutably proven—as happens repeatedly today—that the judgement is the bearer of truth. If we say from the outset that what is true is whatever is valid and continue: there is something valid only where there is acknowledgement, and acknowledgement is the expression and fundamental act of affirmation, and affirmation is the fundamental form of judgement, then truth as validity is connected with judgement as affirmation. This simply cannot be refuted. But the question is: Is validity the essence of truth, or is this characterization of truth as validity and validation not the most trivial and superficial interpretation, one that only the sound common sense of routine thought can and must hit upon? We shall later come to see that this is indeed the case.
As assertion, the λόγος ἀποφαντικός certainly has the possibility of being true or being false, but this manner of being true, of becoming manifest, is