comportment and grounds it is what we call a fundamental comportment: being free in an originary sense.
Whatever is binding, however, announces itself to the pointing out as a being that in each case is or is not in such and such a way; one that is or is not in general; one that is of this essence or another. Accordingly, this fundamental comportment having the character of letting oneself be bound in being held toward something must intrinsically occur in such a way that in it beings are manifest as such in advance. This manifestness of beings as such is in turn of such a kind that propositional comportment, because it is an ability, is in each case able to express itself both with respect to being such and such and with respect to that-being, as well as with respect to what-being.
We can see more and more clearly in particular respects the essential contrast between the animal's being open and the world-openness of man. Man's being open is a being held toward ..., whereas the animal's being open is a being taken by ... and thereby a being absorbed in its encircling ring.
d) Pre-logical being open for beings as completion (as a prior
forming of the 'as a whole') and as an unveiling of the being of
beings. The tripartite structure of the fundamental occurrence in
Dasein as the originary dimension of the assertion.
Yet even with this we have not yet exhausted what necessarily has to occur at all times in this fundamental comportment of our original, pre-predicative being open for beings. We can easily see what is missing if, without any pre-formed theories, we simply inquire once more into the tendency to point out that we find in a simple assertion, and if we remain circumspect about the leeway within which the assertion necessarily moves.
As an example of a simple assertion we shall again take the statement 'The board is black'. It is 'simple' in the sense of the Aristotelian άπλῆ άπόφανσις because it does not present a complex or artificially constructed sentence-formation. Yet for all its simplicity, indeed perhaps through this very simplicity, this λόγος is in fact not 'simple' in the sense of something spoken staightforwardly and naturally. We can sense straightaway that this statement is, as it were, ready-made for logic and the study of grammar. And here we are trying precisely to free ourselves from the shackles of these disciplines. The other assertion we mentioned, 'The board is badly positioned', is simpler in the sense of something spoken naturally and spontaneously, as it were, if we take it not so much in the form of an enunciation we have made, but rather in the form of something we quietly say and think to ourselves. The question is what we should now do with this example 'The board is badly positioned' with respect to our problem. What is at stake now is no longer the structure of the λόγος itself (for we have established this in various directions), but