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§74 [506-508]

one from which the λόγος first springs and indeed always does so. The question is: How are we to grasp in a unitary way this fundamental occurrence in Dasein as represented by the three moments?

Yet does this fundamental occurrence that is supposed to make the λόγος possible have anything at all to do with what Aristotle mentions as the condi­tion of the possibility, and thus as the origin, of the λόγος ἀποφαντικός, i.e., with σύνθεσις-διαίρεσις or with the σύνθεσις expressed in the 'is' of the copula? Is not everything we have come across very much richer and more complicated than what Aristotle indicates in this manner? Certainly, but for us this means only that we must provide an actual interpretation that leads to an understanding of why Aristotle, on his first journey into this originary dimension, had to grasp the fundamental condition in this way. And here we must remark that what Aristotle traces the λόγος back to—σύνθεσις that is also intrinsically διαίρεσις—for all its formality can by no means be taken as something self-evident. If our elucidation of the origin of the entire essential construction of the λόγος is legitimate, then we must also be able to clarify from this how something like σύνθεσις-διαίρεσις is possible, and what we are fundamentally to understand by it.

We said furthermore that what Aristotle posits as the ground of the possi­bility of the λόγος ἀποφαντικός—namely σύνθεσις-διαίρεσις—is that relating and relational comportment in which the 'as' and the 'as'-structure emerge. If this is so, and if what Aristotle sees only indeterminately and faintly as σύνθεσις-διαίρεσις belongs to the rich and articulated structural context of that fundamental occurrence expressed as holding the binding character of things toward oneself, completion, and the unveiling of the being of beings, then it must be in this context that the 'as'-structure itself emerges. However, to the extent that the 'as' is a structural moment of what we call world—world taken as the manifestness of beings as such as a whole—then with this funda­mental (tripartite) occurrence we have hit upon that occurrence in which there occurs what we call world-formation. This is all the more likely since to the structure of world, according to our formal analysis, there belongs the 'as a whole', which evidently belongs to completion and forms within it.


§74. World-formation as the fundamental occurrence in
Dasein. The essence of world as the prevailing of world.


We are thus approaching a direct and immediate interpretation of the phe­nomenon of world, initially via the guiding thread outlined through our formal analysis: world as manifestness of beings as such as a whole. If we take up this determination of world directly, we find nothing at all said of the assertion or the λόγος. Why then did we investigate these? Was it a detour? In a certain

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