sense, indeed—yet it was one of those detours by which all philosophizing moves around what it is asking about. On the other hand, it was not a detour in the sense of a superfluous journey, if we consider that the philosophical tradition unknowingly treats—under the title of λόγος, of ratio, of reason—what we are seeking to unfold as the problem of world. To the present day, the problem has remained unrecognizable for us in its disguises, because these titles and what is dealt with under them have long since been taken as extrinsic questions, and can be freed from their congealment only with difficulty. We will learn from history only if we first awaken it and keep it so. The fact that we are incapable of learning anything from history anymore says only that we ourselves have become ahistorical. No period has known such an influx of tradition, and none has been so poor in genuine tradition. λόγος, ratio, reason, spirit—all these titles are disguises for the problem of world.
Through our showing, however, that λόγος, in accordance with its intrinsic possibility, points back to something more originary, we have also made four things clear: [1.] The λόγος is not the radical approach to unfolding the problem of world. [2.] This problem must therefore be set aside, so long as the λόγος in the broad sense (together with its variations) dominates the problematic of metaphysics, so long as metaphysics is "Science of Logic" (Hegel). [3.] If, however, this questioning along the lines of the λόγος was able to assert itself for so long and to lead to major philosophical works, then we cannot dream of eliminating this tradition at one fell swoop. [4.] This can only happen, rather, by our taking upon ourselves the effort to transform man, and thereby traditional metaphysics, into a more originary existence [Dasein], so as to let the ancient fundamental questions spring forth anew from this.
We attempted to undertake what we have identified once more in the fourth point by way of a dual approach: initially, without orienting ourselves toward any particular metaphysical question, by awakening a fundamental attunement of our Dasein, which is to say, in each case transforming the humanity of us human beings into the Da-sein in ourselves. We then attempted conversely, without constantly or explicitly referring to this fundamental attunement, yet still tacitly recalling it, to unfold a metaphysical question under the title of the problem of world. This in turn occurred by way of the wider detour of a comparative examination using the thesis: The animal is poor in world. This thesis apparently brought us merely negative results, until we proceeded to an interpretation of the thesis that man is world-forming. The interpretation as a whole led us back into an originary dimension, into a fundamental occurrence in which we now claim that world-formation occurs. The three things we claimed as fundamental moments of this occurrence, namely holding the binding character of things toward oneself, completion, and the unveiling of the being of beings, are something that, in their specifically rooted unity, we never ever find in any sense in the animal. Yet these things are not simply lacking in