necessity of transforming our orientation of questioning, which entails our entering into this fundamental occurrence. We approached this fundamental occurrence by returning into the originary dimension of the λόγος. In itself this fundamental occurrence is not primarily or solely related to the λόγος. The λόγος is merely grounded in it in its possibility. Leaving aside the terminological and thematic coining of the distinction, we shall venture the essential step of transposing ourselves into the occurrence of this distinguishing in which the distinction occurs. To put it another way, we shall inquire concerning the primordial structure of this fundamental occurrence. We became familiar with this fundamental occurrence via the three moments of holding oneself toward something binding, completion, and unveiling the being of beings. Yet we are not to take cognizance of these as properties at hand. Rather they are directives for being transposed into Da-sein in an originary and unitary manner.

Let us attempt such transposition, with the intent of discovering the primordial structure of this fundamental occurrence, and of comprehending its originary unity, though not simplicity. The first moment we named addresses us most directly: Holding oneself toward something binding. The binding character of things always already prevails throughout our comportment, to the extent that we comport ourselves toward beings and in such comportment also—not subsequently and by the way—conform to beings, without any compulsion, yet nonetheless binding ourselves, but also unbinding ourselves and failing to conform. We orient ourselves toward beings, and yet are never able to say what it is about beings that binds us, or what the possibility of such binding is grounded in on our part. For not all 'standing opposite' necessarily entails binding, and when we speak of something standing 'opposite' as an ob-ject (the subject-object relation, con-sciousness), then the decisive problem has been preempted—as not posed at all—irrespective of the fact that the objectivity of something standing opposite is neither the sole nor the primary form of binding. Yet however things stand in this respect, a binding character prevails throughout all being related to ..., all comportment toward beings. We cannot explain this binding character in terms of objectivity, but vice-versa.

Likewise in all comportment we become aware of comporting ourselves in each case from out of the 'as a whole', however everyday and restricted this comportment may be. We become aware of both—holding ourselves toward something binding and completion—in their unitary prevailing, even, and indeed precisely, wherever there is any conflict about an assertion's corresponding to what it establishes, or about whether a decision is fitting or an action essential. However concerned we are to comport ourselves with respect to various issues and to speak in terms of individual things, we nevertheless already move directly and in advance within a tacit appeal to this 'as a whole'. A binding character and completion prevail throughout all comportment.