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§76 [527-28]

must together belong to their unity. Projection itself must thus show itself in its originary unity.

It may be hard immediately to see through what we mean by projection in the entire unity of its many forms. And yet we can assuredly and clearly experience one thing straightaway: 'Projection' does not refer to some sequence of actions or to some process we might piece together from individual phases, rather what it refers to is the unity of an action, but of an originary and properly unique kind of action. What is most proper to such activity and occurrence is what is expressed in the prefix 'pro-' [Ent-], namely that in projecting [Entwerfen], this occurrence of projection carries whoever is projecting out and away from themselves in a certain way. It indeed removes them into whatever has been projected, but it does not as it were deposit and abandon them there—on the contrary: in this being removed by the projection, what occurs is precisely a peculiar turning toward themselves on the part of whoever is projecting. Yet why is the projection this turning toward that is a removal? Why is it not a being lifted away to something in the manner of captivated being taken? Why is it not a turning toward something in the sense of reflecting, either? Because this removal that pertains to projecting has the character of raising away into the possible, and indeed—as we must observe into the possible in its possibly being made possible, namely into something possibly actual. Wherever the projection raises us away to—into the possible that is a making-possible—indeed leaves whoever is projecting no rest. Rather what is projected in the projection compels us before what is possibly actual, i.e., the projection binds us—not to what is possible, nor to what is actual, but to making-possible, i.e., to that which the possibly actual in the projected possibility demands of the possibility for itself in order to actualize itself.

The projection is thus in itself that occurrence that lets the binding character of things spring forth as such, insofar as such occurrence always presupposes a making-possible. With this free binding, in which all that makes possible holds itself before what is possibly actual, there is also always a determinacy proper to that which is possible itself. For whatever is possible does not become more possible through indeterminacy, so that everything possible would, as it were, find room and be accommodated in it. Rather whatever is possible grows in its possibility and in the force that makes it possible through restriction. Every possibility brings its intrinsic restriction with it. But the restriction of the possible is here that which is in each case precisely actual, that expansiveness that can be filled, i.e., that 'as a whole' out of which our comportment comports itself in each case. We must therefore say that this single occurrence of projecting in the unity of its essence raises us away in binding us to what is possible, and this simultaneously means: it expands into a whole, holds this before it. The projection is intrinsically completing in the sense of a casting ahead that is the forming of an 'as a whole' into whose realm there is spread out a quite


Martin Heidegger (GA 29/30) The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics