“all of the causes are principles” (1013a17; πάντα τὰ αἴτια ἀρχαί). Heidegger insists that this does not mean simply that the aitiai are a sub-class of archai, included within it as a more restricted field encompassed by a broader one. “Rather: the ‘why,’ in its character as the ‘why’ of something happening in such and such a way, must precisely in this its distinctive trait of being a ‘why’ become ἀρχή of κίνησις, ἀρχή of εἶναι and γένεσθαι or γνῶναι” (WP, 16). Consider an example: why do I build a house in the way I do? The answer lies in the principle of its coming to be, that is, its end (I build the house in this way because it is supposed to serve this end), in the principle of its being what it is (the form of a house), and in the principle of its being known (its account or definition). This suggests an answer to the question with which Heidegger begins this discussion: the motivations for ontological inquiry are to be found in everyday dealings. It is in asking myself why I deal with things in the way I do that I come to seek the principle of their being and their being-known. In case we think that this origin in practical dealings is incompatible with theoretical contemplation, Heidegger adds, “The temporalizing [Zeitigung] of pure looking-at and of tarrying with that which is looked at constitutes ipso facto the meaning of the why” (WP, 16). There is a “why” here as much as in the case of building a house, but here the “why” is to be found in the act of contemplating itself. Heidegger then quotes Metaphysics Γ.2, 1003b17–19, where the philosopher who studies “being insofar as being” (ὄν ᾗ ὄν) is described as seeking to know the causes and principles of ousia. That being and its causes and principles must be disclosed to a pure contemplating appears to explain the next citation in the notes: Metaphysics Δ (V).7 is cited on being in the sense of truth. “Being and the ‘is’ signify that it is true, not-being that it is not true but false” (1017a31–32; τὸ εἶναι σημαίνει καὶ τὸ ἐστιν ὅτι ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθὲς ἀλλὰ ψεῦδος). Heidegger comments, “Here it becomes clear to me: ἀληθές has nothing to do with judgment, there is absolutely no talk of judgment here, it is not the judgment that is true or false, but beings are unconcealed, are there, or are concealed, not there, something deceptive has pushed its way before them” (WP, 16).
The next two pages of the notes, seventeen to eighteen, offer nothing more than a list of Ancient Greek vocabulary with clearly Heideggerian definitions. Elli Bondi was clearly working hard on her Heideggerian Greek! This list tells us nothing about the seminar and is clearly tacked onto the notes for the preceding class. We will pass it over here and move on to the notes for the next class that returns to the reading of the Physics.