ὄν as λέγομενον.” But this means—and this is clearly what Heidegger wants to draw our attention to—that without the introduction of kinêsis and sta-sis as capable of universal participation, we could not understand the very being of the soul in its relation to being. This is why Heidegger claims that what lies behind all of the discussion of “communion” (κοινωνία) is the problem of transcendence (WP3, 5; cf. GA83, 239–240). It is striking that Heidegger, after having drawn attention to Aristotle’s critique of Plato for treating kinêsis as a genus beyond the things themselves, now makes us see the other side: that Plato is motivated, as is Aristotle himself, by the need to understand the being of the soul itself (as orexis) in its relation to being. They both see in their own ways that Dasein is motion and that being itself can be understood only from the perspective of such motion. The crucial point is therefore the one stated most succinctly by Weiss: “the whole prob-lem of being is rolled up in Dasein” (WP3, 5; see also GA83, 240).
For the next two classes of June 11 and June 18, the Weiss notes are terribly disappointing: for whatever reason, they consist of only a few lines listing key terms and concepts discussed in the two sessions. Fortunately, extensive protocols for both classes are published in GA83 and we can use them to reproduce what Weiss misses. According to the published protocol attributed to Liselotte Richter, the June 11 class was a discussion of Sein und Zeit, prompted by the question of the relation between thinking and being (characterized by Plato as a communion between kinêsis and stasis) raised in the previous class. This is a relation that was already thought by Parmenides as a relation of belonging in his saying that “the same is thinking and being” (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι). The position on the relation defended in the class is the one defended in Being and Time (see SZ, 230): “From here it follows that there can indeed exist beings without a subject, but that there can be no being without the subject’s understanding of being” (GA83, 241). Interestingly, however, though Heidegger does not cite Aristotle’s argument against the Megarians in Metaphysics Θ.3 that without the notion of dunamis we lose the independence of the external world and fall into Protagorean relativism, since nothing perceptible would exist outside of being actually perceived (see 1047a4–7), he makes essentially the same argument in claiming that what characterizes a being is “the possibility of being encountered” (241; die Möglichkeit des Antreffbarseins) and that this possibility is not lost in the absence of a knowing subject. In contrast, what characterizes the being of beings is not simply the possibility of being understood; being is to be found only in the