seminars, as Heidegger himself recognizes when in response to the passage he exclaims, “Breach in ancient ontology!” (WP3, 7).
Before turning to Heidegger’s reading, let us review the passage itself at 201a31–b3. Aristotle is arguing that for bronze, being bronze (τὸ χαλκῷ εἶναι; Heidegger would say: being present at hand as bronze) and being potential (τὸ δύναμει τινι [εἶναι]; for example, potentially a statue) can-not be the same thing (οὐ ταὐτόν) since the entelecheia of the potential (for example, to be a statue) as such is motion, whereas the entelecheia of the bronze as bronze is not motion. Aristotle defends this position by appealing to contraries in the passage that is summarized and discussed in the class: “For being capable of being healthy [τὸ δυνάσθαι ὑγιαίνειν] and being capable of being sick [τὸ δυνάσθαι κάμνειν] are different— otherwise being healthy and being sick would be the same thing—but what underlies these contraries [τὸ ὑποκείμενον] and is healthy and is sick, whether this be moisture or the blood, is the same and one” (201a35–b3). The implication Heidegger draws from this passage is that the being of what is potentially (τὸ δύναμει ὄν) must be distinguished from the being of what is present-at-hand (what lies there before and remains the same in undergoing contraries). But that is not all: there is an even more radical implication that again Heidegger draws: that ousia as the presence of what is present-at-hand (the ὑποκείμενον) is not the primary conception of being for Aristotle, but is grounded (WP3, 7; fundiert) in a distinct and prior conception of being as the being of what is potential/ready-for/suitable (δύναμει ὄν). It is this implication that Heidegger sees as a “breach in ancient ontology” (see GA83, 247).10
To understand both implications, we need to look at how Heidegger interprets Aristotle’s definition of motion; and for this we must rely on the published protocol. A piece of bronze is just something that lies around and its being thus present-at-hand is clearly not motion. But the bronze is also suitable for (geeignet zu) a statue or a plaque. When the sculptor takes the piece of bronze that is lying around and starts forming it into a statue or a plaque, the suitability of the bronze becomes present in its suitability. This presence of what is suitable in its suitability is motion (GA83, 245–246). This motion comes to an end with the finished statue or plaque; in the fin-ished product the bronze is no longer present in its suitability as “suitable for,” but is present as a statue or a plaque. As Heidegger emphasizes, and as the translation “suitable for” makes explicit, what is dunaton always has a reference to something else; motion is the presence of this “referring” as
10. Significantly, while in his SS1924 reading Heidegger notes that “Als Holz da sein und verwendbar sein für . . . ist nicht dasselbe” (GA18, 314), he does not there problematize this and certainly does not see there any possible “breach in ancient ontology.”