followed by a question mark in the published protocol. If it is a question, Heidegger’s answer is by no means clear. What follows in the published protocol (and not found in the Weiss notes) is Heidegger’s usual account of how interpreting being from the perspective of logos and thus as on legomenon leads to its identification with the hupokeimenon: what already lies there for a logos as what the logos is about (GA83, 247). We further have the claim that this on legomenon is itself interpreted from the perspective of technê as on poioumenon and only from this perspective can then be identified with what does not need to be produced because always already present-at-hand. All this is simply a rehash of that account of ancient ontology we have seen Heidegger present many times in earlier seminars. But does or does not Aristotle’s account of the being of motion as not a being-present-at-hand represent a breach in this account? For the answer to this question, we must wait a couple of classes.
Starting with the class of July 2 and for all of the remaining classes in July, the Weiss notes will prove much more valuable than they have been until now. This is because, as already noted, Weiss tells us that she herself heard (selbst gehört) the classes in July (WP3, 7). Thus the notes for these classes do not refer to the protocols and presumably are independent of them. This means that they can add something to what we find in the protocols; and, as already noted, in the case of the final class, for which the protocol is missing, they are our only source. We first have confirmed in the class what was implied in the previous class: rest is, in the words of Weiss, only “a limit-case [Grenzfall] of motion” (WP3, 7), or, in the fuller statement of the published protocol (by Richard Haug), “rest is thus a no-longer and a not-yet of motion and therefore is explained from motion” (GA83, 249). This would seem to be a positive answer to the question with which the class opens according to the published protocol: the question of “whether the essence of the ὑποκείμενον as what is simply present-at-hand can be determined through motion” (GA83, 249). But the positive answer is not explicit in either set of notes. In any case, a crucial point added now is that the concept of motion, and that of rest as its limit-case, is not to be restricted to the sphere of technê: the bronze is at rest within the mountain not only relative to its possible manipulation to produce a statue, but also relative to an earthquake (WP3, 7). But recall that, if Heidegger does not think that Aristotle’s definition of motion is restricted to technical production, he clearly believes that it is extended from there to natural motion.
Another crucial point concerns the notion of hupokeimenon itself. Heidegger argues that this term does not in fact express a particular way of