Aristotle defend in Metaphysics Θ.6 between energeia and kinêsis: is there a way of understanding this distinction that does not involve identifying energeia with a mode of presence? And is there a way of understanding the characterization of motion as indeterminate to the point of appearing like not-being without assuming, as Heidegger claims is assumed here, a conception of being as “what is always itself and unchanged” (WP3, 9). None of these are easy questions, but Heidegger, whether we agree with him or not, shows them to be unavoidable.
Heidegger’s reading might seem to be brought into question by what
is apparently his own suggestion, which Weiss quotes citing Moser as the source, that the term energeia is dispensable in the definition of motion (WP3, 10). The reason given is that in the phrase “being potential qua potential” (δυνάμει ὄν ᾗ δυνάμει), the “qua” (ᾗ), or “insofar as,” already expresses the fact that in motion the dunamei on announces itself as such. So the suggestion is that the dunamei on as dunamei on is already motion; in other words, for it to be as dunamei on is already for it to be in motion. The addition “the energeia of” therefore appears superfluous. Weiss does not record, however, Heidegger’s response to this suggestion. Does he end up defending it or does he reject it? For the answer we must consult the published protocol. There Heidegger is recorded as saying that the suggestion is “in a certain way correct” (GA83, 253): if the dunamei on announces itself as such in motion, the term energeia adds nothing to this self-announcement (Bekundung). However, he goes to add that the term is indispensable for expressing the kind of being (Seinscharakter) that belongs to this self-announcement. And what kind of being is that? Presence, of course. So while the term energeia is not needed to express the self-announcement in motion of the dunamei on as such, it is needed to express that the mode of being belonging to this self-announcement is presence (254).
Heidegger in this context considers a possible objection: if the word energeia simply means presence, why use this word at all rather than the word ousia (which for Heidegger also means “presence”)? Heidegger’s answer is that energeia is not simply ousia, but is a determinate modification of ousia (WP3, 10), namely, the one suited to indetermination (254; auf die Unbestimmtheit zugeschnitten). We can thus reformulate the question above: does energeia signify simply a specific mode of presence or does it signify an altogether different conception of being? In defending the former alternative, Heidegger will need to explain what specific mode this is and how it differs from other modes of presence. Heidegger also adds the crucial