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IV. Clearing—Abyss—Nothing [45-47]

is thus the “ground” that is never “present-at-hand” and that is never found, the “ground” that refuses itself in the nihilation as clearing— the supporting-founding one that decides, the one that e-vents—the e-vent.

The nihilation: making room for the purity of the need for grounding (refusal [Ver-sagung] of the ground).

The clearing: the a-byss (open to all directions) 1. of /”to”/ beings, also /to/ ourselves and those like us, 2. of the “as” that everything ultimately is, and that here before all is the as of beyng.

The a-byss: the nothing, what is most a-byssal—beyng itself; not because the latter is what is most empty and general, and what fades the most, the last fumes—but the richest, the singular, the middle that does not mediate and thus can never be taken back.



2. Being: the a-byss


It can “already” be seen with the brightest view in the experience of man from his allotment to “being.”

This still as the beingness of beings, for instance in the sense of the transcendental a priori, and all this within the comportment of “cognition,” of the “mere” representation of something as something from the view toward . . . being.

Here man (?) stands in the open toward something, and the latter in the free domain of the “as”; and the whole [stands] in the opening of beyng, which itself is not “object,” but which “is” precisely already all this, namely this which is open, a-byssal and yet grounding. The ground—as a-byss (and at the same time refusal! [Ver-weigerung]). Joined together as the there and thereness in the insistence of man, an insistence that is not a property “of” man but that is the essential ground for him (genitivus essentialis).



3. Beyng and nothing


Hegel’s negativity is not a negativity because it never takes seriously the not and the nihilating,—it has already sublated the not into the “yes.”

The objective—states in the beingness of unconditioned thinking.

The nihilating: refusal [Ver-sagen] of the “ground,” a- byss.

Beyng “is” the “nothing,”—not because each is equally as undetermined and unmediated as the other, but because they are one and yet “fundamentally” different! They are that which first opens up a “decision.”


Martin Heidegger (GA 68) Hegel