1
Kenneth Maly
What if with the Greeks there were something unthought that is precisely the decisive element for their thinking and for what is thought in the whole history [of thinking]?
(H 259)
At the very end of the seminar on Heraclitus, Heidegger distinguishes between the bearing that Hegel (and all of modern metaphysics1) has on the history of thinking and the bearing that we are to take up. “With Hegel there prevailed the need for fulfillment of what was thought. For us, on the other hand, what holds sway is the thrust of the unthought in what is thought” (H 260).
When Hegel carried out thinking, what was thought, what was already on hand for thinking, had taken on the character of a bifurcation (Entzweiung) and confronted thinking with an opposition within the thinking subject, man. With Hegel, thinking had to overcome this opposition; thinking had to reestablish a unity. Thinking after Descartes found itself with the subject as center, where for the sake of certainty it thought whatever is in terms of the certainty of the subject who thinks. Thinking that thinks what is in terms of the subject—where the subject grants from out of itself the essential character of what is, where the subject is that by which things are—comes to its extreme when it thinks truth as certainty in the full self-knowing of the absolute subject. What Hegel's thinking images is this momentum of the thinking of subjectivity unto its completion, i.e., unto the unity of absolute knowing knowing itself. Hegel writes early in the movement of his own thinking: “Bifurcation is the origin of the need for philosophy.”2 The single most important task that thinking has is to transform the opposition in the bifurcation of what is thought into a new shape, to reestablish a unity from out of the diversity of what is thought.
Whereas Hegel's thinking found itself engaged with what was thought, in order to bring it to fulfillment in a transforming, preserving unifying, Heidegger means for thinking today to take up the demand made on it by the unthought. The issue for thinking today is the unthought, which is decisive for thinking and for what is thought—as well as for what has been thought throughout the history of thinking. It is in the realm of the unthought that what is thought gets decided. What is unthought is not what a thinker “missed” and thus would demand our attention now so that we can “make up” for a past thinker's “lack.” Rather it is the unthought as such that is the issue; and it is the issue as that which carries the thought and bears it up. It is within the unthought that the various turns in the history of thinking have been made. Onqe thinking comes into the extreme of dealing with the thought only from the realm of the thought, by and for the sake of removing therein all bifurcation and reestablishing within itself absolute unity—as in the thinking of modern metaphysics—then, within that movement of thought, the unthought emerges as the issue for thinking.
Thus thinking is not merely a taking possession of what is thought. Thinking has to do not only with what is thought. Rather, thinking is a drawing near to the realm for thinking that is precisely not yet thought; it is a holding to this realm and becoming aware of it.
Heidegger offers the suggestion (as an issue to be worked through) that the unthought is αλήθεια, disclosure. This suggestion is not coincidental; rather it is fitting and appropriate to the emergence of the issue of the unthought. For if the issue is the unthought, then the thinking of the thought (precisely our bestowed way of thinking) must understand how it itself comes to be, how it emerges from out of the unthought that gives it its bearing and that holds it (the thought) in its preserve (in the preserve of the unthought). The issue for thinking is that thinking always and fundamentally thinks the thought from out of the unthought: thinking's thought has a fundamental and originary bond to the unthought—even when thinking means to have dealt in thought with everything, when thinking attempts to transform the unthought into something more transparent to the subject, when thinking transcends the unthought in its essential character as unthought, removing the unthought as essentially unthought by taking it up into the thought.
It is at this point that the unthought demands to be heard and dealt with, thrusting itself upon us. In the movement of thinking that attempts to transcend the unthought, thinking, because of the extreme character of that attempt, finds itself facing the staying power of the unthought, with its power to remain unthought. This staying power of the unthought disturbs the thinking that wants to transcend the unthought; it makes that thinking uneasy. The thrust of the unthought is then issue for thinking.
There is a twofold enigma in this issue: (1) what thinking today essentially is, and (2) the call of that thinking to be intently wakeful to the thrust of the unthought upon it—the thrust of that which it precisely is not, but is capable of. Heidegger's naming the issue άλήθεια is fitting in that thinking today, when it draws near and is intently wakeful to Heraclitus's thinking, is involved in this twofold issue named in άλήθεια, disclosure. First, disclosure is that which lets become manifest to thinking today its own need to overcome the opposition of thought-unthought and to transcend the unthought, transforming it into the thought and reestablishing unity (the fulfillment of the thought). This manifestation becomes an issue for thinking today because it is the disclosure of the essential character of today's age. Secondly, disclosure is that which allows anything at all to be thought or to be. It is in this sense the issue of being: that by which something is. But to give the issue of being the name of “disclosure” is always already to say that the issue of being is this and only this: the emergence into presence, the coming to be of what is. The issue of being as disclosure is disclosure itself, the emergence from out of hiddenness, the unfolding from out of the withdrawing, the ά-λήθεια from out of the λήθη.
Our task in being open to the thrust of the unthought is to follow the unthought in the thought, i.e. to follow in thinking the way in which thinking (= doing = being) comes to presence, comes to be; it is to follow the question: How, from out of where, in terms of what, does thought come to be?
When we approach the fragments of Heraclitus thoughtfully and attempt to lay them out, to gather their import for him and for us, we can never be sure that the imaged as it is imaged for our thinking is correct, in the sense that it fits completely (as would two gears meshed together, a quantitative enmeshing). Many imagings are possible, depending both on the manner in which a thinker gathers the several moments and on the ensemble of images as it shows itself, however obscurely, to a thinker. But beyond that one must raise the question: Is the thinking of Heraclitus carried out in such a way that it demands to be left uncertain—that the thinking, when properly heeded, requires, as part of its essential character, not to be quantified, systematized, or fully unfolded—and thus that any yearning for correctness of interpretation (one that would “mesh”) would necessarily come from something external to the thinking itself? That is, does Heraclitus's thinking image itself in such a way as to call upon genuine thinking to hold back? Does the issue remain for Heraclitus somehow always a question? Would the enigmatic character of his sayings still remain, even if we were able to discover the work as a unified text? The sayings are not oracular or enigmatic because we have lost the coherent context. Rather the issue for Heraclitus's thinking is itself enigmatic. The oracular saying “neither reveals nor conceals, but rather grants hints” (B 93). Heraclitus is “the Obscure” because the issue in his thinking (disclosure) remains essentially—for him and for us—a question (cf. VA 282, III 78).
Thus the problem of retrieving the thought of Heraclitus is twofold: (1) to gain access to the barely accessible fragments, misshaped by philological and philosophical research that has not heeded the questionable character of the issue, and (2) to pay heed to the questioning character itself of Heraclitus's thinking. Our bestowed way of thinking is at work in both aspects of the problem. This (metaphysical) way must be seen for what it is in both of these moments.
Our task in this essay is to think the issue of disclosure (αλήθεια) in Heraclitus as the issue of the unthought for Heidegger's thinking, whereby we must pay heed to the care with which Heidegger approaches Heraclitus (seen above all in the attitude of his thinking and spoken words in the seminar), and whereby we must ruminate on the difficulties that Heidegger sees for any laying out of Heraclitus's thought. Ἀλήθεια, disclosure, is in play in all of Greek thinking; but because it is never thought by the Greeks as an issue, never becomes the issue, it therefore gets covered over and forgotten in its character as that which, although unthought, bears up all of thinking. Thus thinking today can hardly find the issue—and it is generally content with an analysis in terms of personalities or in terms of the consciousness-oriented thinking in which it finds itself,3 leaving entirely out of focus the issue of disclosure itself. This lack of attention to the issue of disclosure is, in turn, responsible for the nonessential character of such efforts at thinking. Failing to heed the issue of disclosure can reach such convolutions that even the dedicated thinker (who gives himself to the issue) is not able to get at the issue until and unless it is granted to him to do so.
In trying to gain a proper access to the fragments, several difficulties of interpretation emerge. First, the text of Heraclitus that we have is in fact impoverished. Heidegger says: “that which we call fragments are no fragments at all, but rather quotations from a text to which they do not belong” (H 242; cf. also 204). Secondly, given the history and “tradition” of our language and concepts (our own bestowal), we tend to say too much, to interpret into the text, to bring our perspective to bear unduly on the fragments.4 Thirdly, once aware of the poverty of the text and of the tendency to let our conceptual and linguistic structures bear too much on our understanding of Heraclitus's fragments—which at his time were not yet loaded down with these structures—still perhaps the most fundamental difficulty for our thinking is the impenetrability of Heraclitus's thinking in his thought. Heraclitus as he lived and thought is closed off to our thinking. We have only what he thought (not the thinking itself or the living that lived the question What is philosophy?). This third difficulty is then the leap that our thinking must make into the context in which the thought was thought: it is the difficulty of the movement of our thinking among the fragments of Heraclitus.
This third issue is not separable from the second one. In our attempt to understand how Heraclitus himself carried out thinking, we must remain aware of our attempt to rethink the fragments.
Given the several fundamental difficulties, it becomes clear to our thinking that we cannot retrieve Heraclitus in his thinking nor the thinking in the thought. Thus we are engaged at best in a rethinking that pays heed to the fragments themselves, to the said and the unsaid within them.
(This is the same issue as the issue of the “not yet metaphysical” place of Heraclitus and the “no longer metaphysical” stance that we take [H 108, 123f.]. We can think the not yet metaphysical character of Heraclitus's thinking only from out of our own bearings within metaphysics. The question then is: How can the relationship of Heraclitus's thinking, which comes before metaphysics, be named in terms of metaphysics—as “not yet metaphysical”—even if it should have in some sense prepared the way for metaphysics? On the other hand, how is our thinking “no longer metaphysical,” given its rootedness within metaphysics and its necessary bond to metaphysics? The name “not metaphysical” is insufficient in characterizing the “not yet” in Heraclitus's thought and the “no longer” in ours. But the attempt to think these junctures named therein opens up the possibility of thinking beyond metaphysics while being essentially within it. It is to think the possibility of preserving the essential character of the fragments, once thinking again gains an insight into this character, and then to absorb—that is, surpass and preserve—it into the movement of thinking that carries metaphysics along in the direction beyond metaphysics. Such a thinking would be intently wakeful to the issue of disclosure as it is presented for thinking today.)
But if the fragments of Heraclitus are so closed off to our thinking, what do they offer us? What they offer us is named as possibility in the second aspect of the problem of retrieval, mentioned above: paying heed to the essential character of Heraclitus's thought, i.e., to its questioning. Our task is not to retrieve Heraclitus's thinking as he carried it out, but rather “through interpretation to get into the dimension which is called for (insisted upon) by Heraclitus's thinking” (H 32). Our task is not to question the reliability of the text of the fragments for the sake of philological correctness; it is rather to become intent upon (draw near to) the question of Heraclitus's thinking—and that from out of our bearings within the metaphysical thinking that has closed off the fragments to us.
Any interpretation of Heraclitus today stands within the bestowal. Thus the interpretation is always already a dialogue between Heraclitus and our established and bestowed way of thinking, a going back and forth from Heraclitus to us. The only speaking possible for us is from out of the movement of this “dialogue, which is fundamental for thinking and above all for the pathway on which we are moving [in thought]” (H 186). Our task is to get at the issue for thinking in the context of a dialogue with Heraclitus, hearing him as best we can through language and responding to what is heard from out of our position within the bestowal of thinking. Heidegger's aim in the seminar is our aim: “a determining of the issue for thinking within a dialogue with Heraclitus” (H 122). Our aim is not a secured interpretation, but entry into the movement that can free us unto the issue; it is to get into the dimension demanded from thinking by Heraclitus's thought.
Thinking has to hold to the issue and to hold itself back from interpreting too much, from understanding too quickly and thereby dismissing the issue. Heidegger says: “we know too much and believe too quickly to be able to become at home in a question properly experienced. For that, one needs the ability to wonder at the simple and to take this wonder as one's abode” (VA 259, III 55). In becoming aware of our blindness as being within metaphysical thinking, which has closed off the one issue in Heraclitus, we are suddenly astonished and wondering again. The issue is worthy of question again; we undergo the experience of standing in wonder before that which is wonder-full, but whose astonishing character has long ago ceased to come forth and be seen. From out of this insight into the need to regain the experience of wonder, our thinking sees the appropriateness of thinking Heraclitus in order to get into the dimension of what is to be thought at all. For it is in Heraclitus and early Greek thinking that this wonder and astonishment was still experienced. Thinking through Heidegger s pathway of thought, Walter Biemel writes: “Returning to the early thinkers is returning to the questions in which the questionable first of all flashed up.”5
Beneath the realm of the thought in Heraclitus's thinking the unthought vibrates in hidden manner. Our thinking must relearn astonishment in the presence of this unthought. Thinking's task is to gather thought, to bring it together, in such a way that the unthought emerges as issue. But the disclosure of the unthought to thinking does not unfold for thinking in order to be transcended or abolished, to be taken up into thought. Rather, when heeded, the unthought as issue manifests its own refusal to yield itself up to thought; and thus it shows its essential character as insisting on continual astonishment. It is the interplay between this withholding and manifesting of the unthought that is the issue for thinking. It is the issue of disclosure and hiddenness: ἀ-λήθεια.
The one issue for philosophy, pursued by Western man ever since the early Greeks, was first named, in Parmenides, as: αλήθεια. This was philosophy's first name, which very soon yielded to other names until it became fixedly named as: philosophy, its name in the academic world today. The almost unbreachable gap between philosophy today and αλήθεια can be seen in the insistence by academic philosophy that the unthought of άλήθεια is not an issue for it. In its initial shape, άλήθεια, the activity that we now call philosophy was most fittingly named, for it lacked all designation and thereby as name allowed for all possibility. For us within our bestowed way of thinking, the issue of philosophy is extremely designated. It is almost impossible for our thinking to get any distance from the issue of philosophy as it has become designated. The terminology of the words used in the designation has an almost unbreakable grasp on our thinking.
Our task—that which the careful reading of the Heidegger/Fink seminar on Heraclitus calls for—is to regain the issue hidden by the terminology and to try to think the essential character that indeed is covered over within the word, but which remains. The issue withholds itself, but it is still hidden there. Thus there is the possibility that by thinking the hidden issue without terminology's authoritative hold, by thinking the essential character hidden within, thinking can again attain to the dimension in which early Greek thinking gained insight into what lay before it: ά-λήθεια.
For Parmenides ά-λήθεια still meant the uncovering and was still involved in that which is behind what shows itself, which withholds itself, but which makes all showing possible. Ἀλήθεια was coming forth out of the veiled, a revealing (unveiling). The issue for “philosophy” (not yet thought or present in the form that is suggested by the word) was the emergence into presence, coming forth from hiddenness, the “how” of what is present. And for early Greek thinking this emerging of what is always remained essentially tied to λήθη, to something which was precisely not present, to something hidden or withdrawing. Ἀλήθεια was “withdrawing presence.” Disclosure was understood as emergence into presence (the coming to be of what is) from out of withdrawing λήθη.
This original and originary sense of ἀ-λήθεια quickly got covered over and reduced to the sense of correctness and became used mostly for verba dicendi; αληθές was primarily used to indicate whether the spoken statement is “true” or “false” and thus to indicate what is true, real, or actual.6 The momentum of ἀλήθεια in terms of disclosure, “withdrawing presence,” subsided. The word very quickly lost its freshness. Ἀλήθεια no longer carried the necessary meaning, and the issue of άλήθεια took on a new name; first philosophy, or simply, philosophy.
As Heidegger repeatedly says, the issue of ἀλήθεια, of the disclosure in which what is comes to be at all, remains unthought as such from the time of early Greek thinking onward. Ἀλήθεια was, however, said in the beginning; thinking dealt in terms of ἀλήθεια without making it explicitly an issue. Ἀλήθεια did not become the question or issue for thinking, although early Greek thinking thought in terms of it and even spoke of it.
Parmenides named the issue for thinking: ἀλήθεια. He gave that name to the issue of his own thinking. He says:
ή μέν δπως εστιν τε καί ώς ούκ εστι μή είναι
πειθοϋς εστι κέλευθος (Ἀληθείηι γάρ όπηδεί)
Fr. 2, 3f.
How there is coming to be (at all) and how not coming to be cannot be—
This is the reliable way of going (for it goes the way of ἀλήθεια).
. . . χρεώ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι
ήμεν Ἀληθείης εύκυκλέος άτρεμές ήτορ
ήδέ βροτών δόξας, ταϊς ούκ ένι πίστις ἀληθής.
Fr. 1, 28 ff.
... but it is fitting that you come to know everything:
the unwavering heart of well-rounded Ἀλήθεια
as well as the holding of opinions by mortals, in which there is no reliability in terms of ἀλήθεια.
It is here in Parmenides's poem that ἀλήθεια, disclosure, is named for the first time in the history of thinking. It is that in terms of which thinking gains insight into coming to be and into the essential character of coming to be: that there is always already a coming to be, an emerging into presence: that not at all coming to be is not possible. Ἀλήθεια, disclosure, is that which guides thinking when it thinks the question of είναι: coming to be. Ἀλήθεια is the momentum that bestows to what is its bearing; it holds what comes to presence in its proper place within disclosure.7
Thinking has to undergo the experience of the well-rounded disclosure. Thinking is to experience that unwavering heart of the well-rounded disclosure: the λήθη in which all presencing rests, from.out of which it emerges, and which holds all presencing. All coming to be and all thinking have their bearing in terms of the disclosure. That is, disclosure is that by which everything (1) is and (2) becomes understood. Thinking is thus bound to this realm of the disclosure.
Disclosure [Unverborgenheit] is, as it were, the element in which there first of all is being as well as thinking and their belonging-together. Ἀλήθεια is indeed named at the beginning of philosophy, but from then on it is not really thought as such by philosophy (ZSD 76).
What is this “difference” between being involved in the thinking (being named) and not being thought as such? How is it that early Greek thinking thought in terms of disclosure but did not focus upon and think the issue of disclosure as such? How was disclosure in play in Greek thinking while it remained unthought? Can we now understand better how the issue of the unthought is the issue of disclosure?
What was thought and experienced was only that which ἀλήθεια grants: what comes to presence and thus is. Because ἀλήθεια itself remained hidden and unthought, what comes to presence lost its connection to the presencing and became thought only in terms of itself—removed from its essential bearing within disclosure. This essential bearing got covered over and forgotten.
This initial covering over of disclosure as issue has to do with the character of the issue of the unthought. Had disclosure become explicitly the issue for early Greek thinking, then we could imagine another outcome for the history of thinking. But this other possible outcome has no bearing on the issue. For that the issue of disclosure remained hidden to thinking belongs essentially to the disclosure of the issue that we have to deal with. It is not the “fault” of thinking, and neither is it accidental, that disclosure as issue remained hidden and unthought. For the λήθη in ἀλήθεια is at the core (heart) of ἀλήθεια.
As we think the issue, our first attempt to understand the issue is to gain insight into the step back from metaphysics: that what is is not something in terms of itself, but that it is as having come to be, as having emerged. Our focus then turns to the emerging, the coming to be, the movement of disclosure. Our initial bearing to what is is that it is there as something constant; and thinking tends (and has tended throughout all epochs of metaphysics) to assume that its ground or cause is also something constant. Thus “God” or “Being” (capitalized!) have this character for us today. The entire issue is in terms of what is. What is becomes thought as phenomenon—and philosophy today hardly grants anything else to be possible. The phenomenon—be it what shows itself in language or in scientific research—is all that is at issue. In our thinking here this first turn toward disclosure is a turn away from this metaphysical way and toward understanding the coming in the coming to be: that there is an emergence.
But the phenomenon, when heeded carefully, shows itself precisely as that which shows itself; thinking must heed the showing.
Heidegger's thinking has not only carefully engaged itself in the phenomenon as it shows itself (thus in the showing itself, in Erschlossenheit), but it has also verged upon and made several approaches toward the issue of the hidden character of that which grants the showing. (It is essential to keep in mind that fundamental thinking cannot penetrate this hidden realm. It is as unfitting for thinking to penetrate the λήθη as it is for Odysseus actually to enter the underworld during his stop at the underworld on his journey home to Ithaca. As the shades emerged from out of their realm to meet Odysseus, so does the showing emerge from out of its realm in the hidden.) Heidegger's thinking has dealt with two essential issues that philosophy has not handled before: (1) the issue of the showing of the phenomenon: that whatever is is as disclosed, shown; and (2) the issue of the unthought withdrawing character of the disclosure. This second issue (that of the λήθη in ἀλήθεια) is the issue that is continually left unheeded in Fink's interpretation of the fragments, to which Heidegger, then, must continually return. His return takes the shape of questions raised, hints made, and repeated warnings to hold back in interpretation. That Heidegger's holding onto the issue of the λήθη takes these shapes in the seminar is because of (1) the character of the seminar, in which Fink primarily determines the course of the discussion, even though Heidegger is the “intellectual leader”—stemming from his own being in touch with the issue—and (2) the character of the issue of λήθη, which somehow does not let itself be thought. When philosophy brings the issue that is in front of it to its furthermost, then in that extreme something always remains essentially hidden and unthought—something that cannot be thought by philosophy and is no longer the issue for philosophy (ZSD 71), although thinking must always pay heed to that which is hidden therein.
Philosophy's issue remains essentially that which it cannot think; the unthought is that which grants to thinking, although it itself cannot be thought. The unthought in the issue of ἀλήθεια is first of all the issue itself; but more fundamentally the issue is the λήθη in the ἀλήθεια.
The issue of ἀλήθεια points initially to what comes to appearance, to what has left the λήθη behind. This is imaged in the character of the a- as an α-privativum. But the juncture in which something comes out of hiddenness calls on genuine thinking precisely to be drawn into the nearness of the λήθη. For it is in the end the astonishing issue that transposes us into wonder. How are we capable of this λήθη?
Thus Heidegger begins his interpretation of Heraclitus and his own pathway of thinking with Fr. 16 of Heraclitus:
τό μή δύνόν ποτέ πώς αν τις λάθοι;
How could anyone hide himself from that which never goes under?
This fragment belongs, according to Heidegger, at the outset of any interpretation of the fragments of Heraclitus. It must be thought as the fragment that, when thought, grants to our thinking its entrance into the issue for thinking, then and now and always: withdrawing presencing, disclosure, showing from out of hiddenness.8
Heidegger's efforts in his dealing with Fr. 16 are solely for the purpose of “bringing us, by means of a dialogue with an early thinker, nearer to the realm of what is to be thought” (VA 261, III 57).
The fragment is in the form of a question and begins with the last word of the saying: λάθοι, from λανθάνω: I remain hidden.9 Man (i.e., τις, anyone) cannot remain hidden (how could he?) from το μή δΰνόν ποτέ. In a series of carefully thought out responses to the possible meaning of that phrase—always holding to the fundamental question: what was at issue therein for Heraclitus?—Heidegger works toward an originary way of thinking that one realm of disclosure.
Literally and at first glance τό μή δΰνόν ποτέ means: what does not go under. How could anyone remain hidden in the presence of that which does not set? Then Heidegger thinks what δύειv meant for the Greeks: to go into something, to go under (e.g., the setting sun goes into the sea), to go under or behind the clouds. “As the Greeks thought it, going under takes place as a going into hiding” (VA 266, III 63). Thus what does not go under is that which does not go into hiding or disappear.
What does not go into hiddenness or hiding is something that is always in the movement of emerging (Aufgehen). It is the continual coming out of, the continual uncovering or disclosing. Thus the saying has to do with the realm of disclosure and not of hiding as such. (There is not some static realm devoid of movement which is hidden and lying at the basis of what comes to be; rather the hidden character of disclosure gets its essential character from out of the momentum of disclosure: the one realm is the movement of λήθη/ἀ-λήθεια.)
Thus Heidegger thinks the μή ... ποτέ as being other than a denial of going into hiding (in which there would be no hiding left)—the meaning it would have if Heraclitus had used ούκ instead of μή.
The μή .. . ποτέ says the movement whereby there is always a going away from and moving toward the realm of the δΰνόν, λήθη, or hiding. The not going into hiding is a continual distancing from it while essentially tied to it. Thus the τό μή δΰνόν ποτέ is the very not going into hiddenness. It is not about something that moves into or out of hiddenness, but is rather about the movement itself. Heraclitus thinks only the emerging, for it alone is movement (the λήθη alone is not movement and is by itself not the one issue for thinking). Heraclitus names the hiding in terms of never going into it. It provides an impetus for thinking and being, but is, taken by itself, not the realm. In one word Heraclitus names both the not-going into hiding and the ever-pervading emerging: the never going into λήθη and the ever-pervasive emerging from out of it. The moment of the essential interplay “into” and “out of” is the one realm of disclosure. Thus Fragment 16 says: How could anyone remain hidden from this interplay of δΰνόν, this movement into and out of λήθη? It is the central issue, the one realm for thinking. “It is that [realm] within which ... every possible ‘whither’ of a belonging-to resides” (VA 272, ΠΙ 68). This realm is the one realm named in all of Heraclitus's basic words: φύσις, πυρ, λόγος, ἀρμονίη, πόλεμος, έρις, εν. (A future task for thinking is to think how all these words image this interplay named in δΰνον.) The realm of τό μή δϋνόν ποτέ is the realm of λήθη/ἀ-λήθεια. It is the hidden character of this interplay λήθη/ἀ-λήθεια that remained unthought when early Greek thinking thought that which αλήθεια granted.10
Only that which Ἀλήθεια as clearing grants is thought [in Greek thinking], not what it is as such. This remains hidden. Does that happen by accident? Does it happen only because of a negligence of human thinking? Or does it happen because the self-hiding, the hidden, the λήθη, belongs to Ἀ-Λήθεια, not as a mere addition, as a shadow belongs to light, but as the heart of Ἀλήθεια? And does there reign in this self-hiding of the clearing of presence yet another hiding and preserving, from out of which disclosure can first of all be granted and what comes to presence can thus appear in its presence? (ZSD 78)11
The coming together of λήθη and ἀ-λήθεια is not a static unity or an identity without difference; it is not a hollow oneness. Rather it is an interplay, a movement of a belonging-together. It is a dimension of the between, that juncture into which thinking must penetrate, holding it open as juncture, as interplay. It is the play of differences, the realm of movement that lays claim to what is (and to thinking) and into which what comes to be must continually be released.
Thinking responds to the movement of disclosure so that thinking itself can move, can go the way of disclosure whereby it is ready (readied in the response) for the enabling of disclosure, which enables thinking to recharacterize what is its issue, to regain a bearing to the unthought.
Disclosure, as the interplay between λήθη and ἀ-λήθεια, is both an issue for thinking and an issuing: it is that which issues and that from which any matter for thinking becomes an issue.
The interplay between ἀλήθεια and λήθη is from out of a withdrawing, holding unto itself. Thus it has a twofold within the onefold that it is: the onefold of the interplay maintains the twofold of emerging (in the “from out of”) and of withholding. This is its essential character. For if there were only emerging, coming to be, presencing, that would destroy the interplay (that is what the reduction of the unthought to the thought does). On the other hand, if there were only withholding, withdrawing, then the interplay would lose its enabling power. (This is what took place in the turn into metaphysics, which forgot the issue of disclosure as such and had to deal only with what was present and to understand the enabling [that by which] only in terms of what is, resulting in being's having the character of a being, of something that is.) In either case what would take place is a mere transformation, i.e., transcending (an escape into transcendence). Rather the interplay must be thought as an ενέργεια, a being at work together, a momentum back and forth, a vibrating within itself. The interplay is always at work and thus is always involved in the being of whatever is. The “being” of anything is, therefore, never separate from the interplay of disclosure. What is in the world is, having gotten its “being” from the ενέργεια of the disclosure, from the withholding enabling that is “at work” in the interplay.
The way of thinking has been bestowed to us in which we think everything that is as something in itself, separate from the ενέργεια of the disclosure. In our thinking we give a metaphysical import to what is present, what comes to be. Thus that which does not show itself as something that is, is not. The unthought is not a part of the issue for thinking. Now, the issue that Heidegger thinks in thinking the interplay of ἀ-λήθεια is nothing that is. Yet it is in some way present for thinking: it has issued for thinking, i.e., has become an issue. (Thus he can speak of a Nichts that has nothing to do with nihilism.) To call the issue ἀλήθεια is to let that dimension be seen which enables what is to be and enables any kind of understanding of that. Ἀλήθεια names the issue in a new way: it focuses on that which enables, on the very movement of coming to presence, on disclosure itself. (This focus is less likely when the issue is called “being.”)
The one word in Fr. 16 that we have left unthought up until now is: τις, anyone. With that word our thinking comes to the central question of man's relation to disclosure. For the τις names man. Who is man? What is the essential character of man? In order to handle, i.e., think, this issue of man in terms of the fragment, thinking has first to undergo an experience of how ἀλήθεια is disclosure for the Greeks and then, beyond what the Greeks thought, to think ἀλήθεια as the emerging of the self-withholding, the withdrawing emerging (cf. ZSD 79).
There are two central issues within the one issue of man and disclosure. (1) How is man within the interplay of disclosure? How could anyone (man) remain hidden from the interplay of λήθη/ἀ-λήθεια? That is, man has to do with the interplay, is in play in the shaping of the interplay. We must understand how the establishing by the subject in modem metaphysics and how the provocation in modem technology (with whose emergence man has something to do but that in turn provokes man) are themselves moments of disclosure. The provocation and the establishing by the subject are disclosures, are ways of ἀλήθεια. (2) How is man called upon to think, given his own place within disclosure, given that disclosure is not without man but is also not controlled by him? Man's essential character, what he is called upon to be, is to be heedful of, to be awake (wakeful) to the issue. Man has as essential task: wakefulness, νόος.
Disclosure was first named by Parmenides. But whereas for early Greek thinking it was essentially involved in the issue of thinking—though it was itself left unthought—the turn into metaphysics turned to what was disclosed and forgot the issue of disclosure as such, i.e., lost sight of the involvement of all thinking and being in the movement of the interplay of disclosure as such.
Given this forgotten character of disclosure, thinking could attain to that shape in which the subject poses its own self. The subject who poses can only be man. Through the establishing of man as subject, objects come to be for the first time, over against the subject as consciousness. Given the fundamental character of disclosure—as an emerging from out of a hiddenness—this establishing of the human subject as the measure in terms of which whatever is is as it is, the disclosure that is subjectivity in consciousness-oriented thinking could not recognize itself as a disclosure. It is only in having undergone the experience of ἀλήθεια that thinking can gain the insight that the subjectivity of the subject and the rational character of consciousness-oriented thinking belong essentially to the disclosure that is modern metaphysics. (The same holds for the provocation of modem technology. From out of itself alone it is blind to its character as emerging from out of disclosure: that it is the disclosure in which what is is present as provoked, provoked to fit into the planning and ordering, which is precisely how the essential character of modern technology discloses itself.)
In the disclosure of modem metaphysics, in which thinking follows what is disclosed and takes its measure from out of it, the possibility of thinking (gaining insight into) disclosure as such is closed off. Heidegger's first major (and still most essential) contribution to philosophical thinking is his insight in Sein und Zeit into the essential character of man as Dasein, contrasted to the knowing of consciousness-oriented thinking of subjectivity, in which the known is as object of the subject, including the known as the noema of a noesis: every noema is fundamentally object for consciousness. It is this fundamental insight of Heidegger's into man as Dasein that opens up the possibility of thinking disclosure as such.
In the Heraclitus seminar Heidegger remarks: “In Sein und Zeit Dasein is written as: Da-sein. The Da is the clearing and openness [Lichtung and Offenheit] of what is, which man undergoes (passes through)” (H 202). The clearing or open (the realm of the interplay), in which what is comes to be, encounters man. Consciousness is possible only as derived from this momentum of the vibration of the open and man. The interplay is thought only in terms of the emerging that happens within it, i.e., in terms of disclosure. Thus the interplay of the disclosure has significance only in terms of man.
This relation of disclosure to man is, for Heidegger, fundamental to the understanding of how things come to be in the world, or in terms of ἕν and πάντα (cf. the first six sessions of the seminar). That is, the issue of disclosure and man lies at the basis of the issue of the coming to be of world or of what is in it. This brings us to a crucial juncture in understanding the movement that thinking takes in the seminar: Fink's bearing toward Heraclitus is secondary in that it begins with and holds to the issue of world and its coming to be, without first coming to terms with the issue of ἀλήθεια as such.12 This is necessary because of the possibility that the way of ἀλήθεια has an essential bearing on the essential character of the ἕν, i.e., of that by which world is at all. The danger in Fink's interpretation is that it simply places man within the back and forth movement of the εν and πάντα, of world as enabling and what comes to be within that enabling, without thinking man's essential bearing upon it.
For Heidegger the issue of man is always already essentially there in any coming to be, i.e., disclosure, of world. Thus “man and disclosure” is the primary issue; it must be thought before any thinking of ἕν and πάντα in terms of the world. In focusing only on ἕν and πάντα, εν gains its essential character from πάντα. In the more primordial issue of man and disclosure, ἕν gains its essential character in terms of disclosure as such. Heidegger's question of man and disclosure reveals the questionableness of Fink's approach in that it shows the issue of disclosure to be more fundamental.
Thus the first question for the thinking of the seminar is: What is the character of the movement underlying Heraclitus's thinking? For Fink it is the coming to be of world; for Heidegger it is man's place in the movement. Thus it is that Fr. 16 is the primary fragment for Heidegger, whereas for Fink it is Fr. 64.
Now, the κεραυνός of Fr. 64 is also named πυρ in Heraclitus; and the τό μή δΰνόν ποτέ of Fr. 16 is also named λόγος. Fr. 1 says that (1) everything comes to be in accordance with and owing to λόγος and (2) that men act as though they do not grasp λόγος, i.e., do not remain within the realm of λόγος. The issue of λόγος and the issue of disclosure are the same. Our thinking must be awake to the words λόγος and πΰρ and to their saying the same as το μή δΰνόν ποτέ and άλήθεια, in order to understand Heidegger's weighty remark to Fink in the seminar: “Your way in interpreting Heraclitus proceeds from fire to λόγος; my way in interpreting Heraclitus proceeds from λόγος to fire” (H 179f.). For when λόγος (ἀλήθεια) is not the starting point, then thinking can perhaps understand the coming to be of what is from out of the one (ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα) in Fr. 10; but it cannot think the ἕν πάντων εν in that fragment. When λόγος is not the starting point for interpreting Heraclitus, then thinking cannot understand the emergence of the one; that the one emerges from out of the many (or πάντα) is unthinkable unless one understands the essential character of the εν and then of the πάντα therein. This is possible only when the issue is not in terms of things that are, in terms of what is, but rather in terms of λόγος, of the fundamental gathering or bringing together (λέγειν) from out of the unthought and hidden, i.e., in terms of disclosure. That is, the ἕν does not emerge in terms of πάντα, does not get its determination from what is gathered, but rather in terms of λόγος-ἀλήθεια. Everything in Heraclitus, and in early Greek thinking imaged therein, has to do with disclosure: emerging and the hidden reserve.
Genuine thinking rescues man and disclosure, thinks in such a way that their separation is seen for what it is. This insight, in turn, frees each unto the onefold which they are. But what is the character of genuine thinking, if it is to rescue the separation and to think the one issue? It is the character of thinking as νόος, or νοΰς.
We now return to the second question raised above: How is man to become heedful of disclosure, to become awake to it? To do this our thinking goes back again to the τις of Fr. 16. Heidegger appropriately indicates (VA 277, III 73) that τις does not mean just man, but anyone who has the capability of hiding, in which characterization the gods are included, too (cf. Fr. 30: “neither of gods or of men”). That is, the “anyone” involved here is anyone who can have care for his own essential character—and therefore who is capable of being blind to it. We cannot call “blind” something that cannot see: a rock is not “blind. ” Thus τις is anyone, man or god, whose own essential character is at issue for him. It is any Dasein, i.e. any existing one for whom his own being is at issue. (“Dasein existiert als ein Seiendes, dem es in seinem Sein um dieses selbst geht”—SZ 406, 12.)
How can anyone remain hidden from λήθη/ά-λήθεια? How can man become or remain blind to disclosure? For us today the clue lies within consciousness- oriented thinking, which insists on a center unto itself. The absolute certainty of subject knowing itself cannot think ἀλήθεια in its essential character as emerging from a withdrawal. The ἀλήθεια of Greek thinking cannot be released from the knowing subject—and thus it becomes determined only in terms of that subject. In that determination its own essential character gets lost, becomes transcended by the consciousness of subjectivity: the unthought of ἀλήθεια becomes thought. But whereas all disclosure is for man, it is not established by man. For man to establish it is to be blind to disclosure as such, i.e., to remain hidden from the λήθη/ἀλήθεια that is disclosure.
This way of thinking dominates in modem metaphysics. We do not see it for what it is; we do not see it as a disclosure but rather take it to be the measure itself. Thus we are measured by ourselves and are blind to all but ourselves. We can remain hidden before this issue by not heeding our being within disclosure. “Everything comes to be in accordance with and owing to λόγος,” but “men act as though they do not grasp λόγος (do not have their abode in λόγος)” (Fr. 1). The impetus for Heraclitus, too, was that man in his time was blind. His thinking is to show the blindness of the men around him, i.e., who were unthinking, not “hearing” the λόγος. Men do not understand. Thus the essential character of genuine thinking is to understand the disclosure in which it is in each epoch and to heed the essential blindness. It is to be intently wakeful to that blindness.
The issue is not to know, but to be awake to. Πολυμαθίη νόον ού διδάσκει: “Learning of many things does not teach wakefulness (νόος)” (Fr. 40). Νοεϊν is to be awake to, to be aware of, to take into one's care (cf. WHD 124-29), to take up, hold, have it there for what it is. Νόος is insight or wakefulness to. Man with νόος is awake, alive to, has his attention directed intently toward. Man is intently open to. The openness of νόος is not a passive receptivity; it is a being prepared intently. “Those who gather and say (λέγοντας) with intent wakefulness must persist in (hold strongly to) what is common” (Fr. 114). But: “Whereas λόγος essentially unfolds as what is common, the masses go on living as if every individual had an own understanding” (Fr. 2). Man is to have νόος: to be awake, to be intently ready for taking carefully in. That is the opposite of blindness. In his essay on Aristotle, Jacob Klein writes: “This state and manner Wakefulness is openness—the very openness of a huge open door. It is not a state of activity, but rather a state of preparedness, of alertness. This state or manner of being is commonly called in Greek νους or νοεϊν.”13
Νους or νόος as rational comprehension is somewhere in the vicinity of the issue of νους as intent wakefulness, for rational comprehension has to do with grasping something. But to call the νους “rational” is to impose structures that are present only after thinking has entered the age of subjectivity. Hegel's identification of νους in Anaxagoras with Denken, which is identical with Ich=Ich (i.e., with Ich denke) is such an imposition.14 For Hegel νους is to be identified with thinking, and thinking is the I think, or the I. Thus νους becomes the self-consciousness of the I. Understood in this way, νους has to do with rational comprehension; but it is no longer the νους of early Greek thinking.
The νόος in Heraclitus's thinking has to do—not with a rational way of dealing with what is, in a rational comprehension—but rather with an intense (intent) wakefulness that is open to the disclosure of what is, to perceive and take it in as it is.15 Everyday man is “overcome by fatigue, his wakefulness yields to sleep.”16 On the other hand man's proper way is wakefulness, openness (cf. H 224ff.).
Why and how are men and gods (τις), that is, those for whom their own being is an issue, not capable of remaining hidden from the τό μή δΰνόν ποτέ? (We must note that the optative in άν τις λάθοι—“how could anyone remain hidden”—has this negating sense and means: “no one really is able to.”) Those beings for whom their own being is an issue are not capable of remaining hidden from the interplay of disclosure because their relation to their own essential character (their being) is nothing other than the interplay itself. That is, man is man only in the interplay, in his intent wakefulness to it. Not all who are biologically determined to be human are men in this essential sense. Being human means precisely being wakeful to (intently aware of) the interplay. This is not possible within the separation that belongs essentially to consciousness-oriented thinking. (Thus man's first and nearest task today, in order to become man, is to become intently wakeful to this disclosure of consciousness-oriented thinking and the subject-object separation inherent within it.)
The hidden in the disclosure itself unfolds. Thus when being wakeful, i.e., being man, man is open not only to the disclosure, but also in the same essential manner to the hidden that grants what is to be disclosed. Man is within this essential bond to the hidden and to that which emerges only when he is intently wakeful. That means for man today: only when he is intently there to allow the limitation of metaphysics to show forth its fundamental character as itself a disclosure.
The phenomenon of the interplay of disclosure, in its various levels of showing, presents to thinking the possibility of a continually new characterization of man in this movement of relation. Properly heeded (in the essential νοείν), the phenomenon of the interplay of disclosure presents precisely the vibrating movement itself, the movement necessary for man to remain wakeful, to remain within his element. Thus the τό μή δύνόν ποτέ is what allows man his wakefulness. In order to be the movement in which man is fundamentally and essentially, the interplay must show itself to have the character of a onefold within it, the character of a whole that somehow encompasses all possibilities and even possibility as such, and to have also the character of a movement that brings about movement.
The λόγος is the gathering that is the measure for the interplay, which measure is the interplay. Man is the one who intently heeds this measuring that is going on in the interplay. This measuring by man, following upon λόγος, becoming aware of it, belongs to man's essential character even when he is not engaged in it. Even when everyday man is blind and unaware, his essential character is to become intently wakeful and to be the place of the measuring of the interplay. Man has to be in the gathering of the disclosure, even when something keeps him from it; it is incumbent upon him as man.
In Fr. 119 Heraclitus says:
ήθος ἀνθρώπω δαίμων.
Man's familiar abode (there where man belongs most properly) is the region open for the daimon.
This most fitting abode for man can be called his ἀρετή, his most proper way to be: in the region open for the daimon, in the region of the interplay.17
When man heeds properly his most proper way to be (intently wakeful for the coming of disclosure), then he is held by and is holding to the gathering of λόγος. Perhaps thinking can gain a fresh insight into the realm of ήθος (ethics) if it thinks man's αρετή as essentially tied to the gathering of λόγος. What today is named ethics and has little bearing on man's proper abode within the open might be renamed elegance (from έ-λόγος): Elegance is being intently wakeful, is dealing with what is in proper fashion. To be ethical is to follow the norms established by society, having then its measure within itself; to be elegant is to follow the gathering of the λόγος, having its measure within the interplay that bears up the elegance of man.
For Hegel's as well as for Heidegger's thinking the ἀλήθεια at the beginning of Greek philosophy was a “not yet.” For Hegel the “not yet” was on the level of immediacy, without mediation, and did “not yet” satisfy (fulfill) the need to unify the thought. For Heidegger ἀλήθεια is also a “not yet.” But it “is a ‘not yet’ of the unthought... a ‘not yet’ for which we do not satisfy, to which we do not give satisfaction” (W 272). In Hegel's thinking the issue of ἀλήθεια was not yet enough; in Heidegger's thinking it is thinking that is not yet enough for ἀλήθεια. What is not yet thought by Heraclitus is unthinkable, not in the sense of lacking the necessary character by which it could be taken up into thought, but rather in its being the ever-pervasive issue for thinking. The issue for thinking remains essentially unthought.
Man cannot remain hidden (how could he?) from the unthought.
Or, to repeat the quotation at the beginning of this essay—with a turning of the phrase that is, one hopes, also appropriate:
If with the Greeks there was something unthought that is precisely the decisive element for their thinking . . . , then how?
1 More than characterizing all possibility in Hegel's thinking, this way of saying the issue rather formulates the essential character of the age of modern metaphysics. The greatness of Hegel's work of thinking lies in what emerges there for the first time and is presented to thinking as that which is to be thought. Thus Hegel's thinking goes beyond the subjectivity of modem metaphysics and thus beyond the limits of the thinking of that (our) age. But Hegel's thinking takes place essentially within the age of subjectivity, i.e., of modem metaphysics. It is this aspect that remains, even today, the foremost and central task for thinking.
The same back and forth movement that characterizes Hegel's thinking in general—moving within and beyond subjectivity at the same time—is in play in his interpretations of Heraclitus and of the Greek world: on the one hand he “read into” Heraclitus from out of the perspective of his own authentic thinking; on the other hand he was not unaware of the essential character of the Greek age (cf. H 195).
The following abbreviations are used in this paper:
H Heraklit. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1970.
VA Vorträge und Aufsätze. Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1954.
WHD Was Heißt Denken? Tübingen: Max Neimeyer Verlag, 1954.
ZSD Zur Sache des Denkens. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1969.
2 G. W. F. Hegel, Differenz des Ficht’sehen und Schelling’sehen Systems der Philosophie (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1962), p. 12.
3 Cf. W 269; for an interpretation of Heraclitus in terms of consciousness and rationality see Charles H. Kahn, “A New Look at Heraclitus,” American Philosophical Quarterly 1:3 (1964): 189-203.
4 Heidegger: “Damit denken Sie schon zu viel” (H 35); “Vielleicht haben Sie damit schon zu viel gesagt” (H 88).
5 Walter Biemel, Martin Heidegger in Selbstzeugnissen und Bilddokumenten (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1973), p. 101.
6 It is perhaps not true to say that this reduction of the meaning of ἀλήθεια takes place only after Parmenides and Heraclitus or after Plato and Aristotle. Rather already in Homer the word αληθής meant true only in opposition to false and usually in connection with verba dicendi. This leads to the question: Is ἀλήθεια (as ἀ-λήθεια, i.e., as derived from with α-privativum) possibly a strange and estranging shape of a word, estrangingly shaped by early Greek thinking in order “to think the most profound issue”? Perhaps the word ἀ-λήθεια is just that “outrageous, unheard of” formulation of the kind that thinking has gathered throughout the history of its thought. Cf., VA 27,119 (where the reference is to Heidegger's shaping of the word Ge-stell) and SZ 39 (where Heidegger refers to the poverty of ordinary language when thinking is grappling with the one issue for philosophy—how Plato's Parmenides and Aristotle's Metaphysics, Book VII, are “outrageous, unheard of” when compared to a chapter of Thucydides).
7 The poem of Parmenides could as aptly be entitled Ἀλήθεια as περί φνσεος. But the title is not important. What is at issue in the work is the issue for thinking when it is thought in terms of disclosure. And then one could ask: Are Ἀλήθεια and περί φΰσεος as titles the names for different issues? Is not the issue named within both “titles” the one same issue?
8 Heidegger's attempt to lay out Fr. 16, not as a final correct way of interpretation but as a contribution which offers a question to future thinking, must be read, thought, and re-thought by any thinking whose task is to get at the most fundamental issue for philosophy. This attempt is made in his essay “Aletheia (Heraklit, Fragment 16),” in VA 257-282 (III 53-78); English translation in Early Greek Thinking, tr. David Farrell Kreil and Frank A. Capuzzi (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), pp. 102-23.
9 In his essay “Aletheia” Heidegger shows how in Homer and the early Greek language λανθάνω and λανθάνομαι and έπιλανθάνεσθαι all image—and maintain their essential tie to—their root λαθ- and receive their fundamental significance from out of λήθη, remaining hidden.
10 Heidegger says this one realm of the λήθη/ά-λήθεια most clearly in terms of Lichtung: the Lichtung (das Offene) is the clearing for light and darkness, for sounding and fading away, for presencing and withdrawal. The task for thinking is not to go further “back” beyond Lichtung to something behind it; it is to learn from out of the Lichtung itself, i.e. “to let something be said to us . . . from out of it” (ZSD 72).
11 Cf. my paper “Subject, Dasein, and Disclosure,” in Research in Phenomenology 5 (1975): 191 ff.
12 For an opening up of this difference between Fink's and Heidegger's bearing toward Heraclitus, see F.-W. von Herrmann's contribution in this volume. The issue of world is never really clarified in the seminar itself. For Fink world is the condition for the possibility of what is in the world. Thus world grants what is in it. World in this sense is the ἕν or κεραυνός, which lights up and thus grants what is in the world its place therein. Heidegger's questioning in the seminar tries again and again to show that the issue named in Fink's problematic has another issue underlying it: the issue of disclosure. But what is left untouched in the entire discussion is the issue of world as it appears in Sein und Zeit, where the issue of world images the issue of Erschlossenheit and then of Sein. It is important for understanding the seminar to know that Fink is not using the word world in the fundamental sense which it has in Sein und Zeit.
13 Jacob Klein, “Aristotle, An Introduction,” in Ancients and Moderns. Essays on the Tradition of Political Philosophy in Honor of Leo Strauss, ed. Joseph Cropsey (New York: Basic Books, 1964), p. 61.
14 G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Vol. I, in Werke (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971), XVIII, 380f.
15 This is in opposition to Kahn's interpretation of Heraclitus. He says: λόγος is “the rational ‘account’” (p. 193); Heraclitus relates “the pattern of nomos to the rational structure of the logos and to reason itself (nous)” (p. 198); “rational comprehension is the knowledge of what is common (xunos)” (p. 198). Cf. Kahn, op. cit.
16 Klein, op. cit., p. 68.
17 In his large work on Heraclitus Marcovich identifies ήθος in this fragment with the Greek word αρετή. In Μ. Marcovich, Heraclitus: Greek Text with a Short Commentary, Editio maior (Mérida, Venezuela: The Los Andes University Press, 1967), p. 504.
From the book Heraclitean Fragments: A Companion Volume to the Heidegger/Fink Seminar on Heraclitus