In a provisional but already clarifying translation, this means:
If you have listened not merely to me, but rather have listened to the Logos (in obedience to it, hearkening to it), then knowledge (which subsists therein) is to say the same as the Logos: one is all.
We will attempt to elucidate this saying by making reference to other sayings in which the same is thought, though from other perspectives, and in which, most importantly, the word λέγειν is used.
We will initially leave the word λόγος, which bears the weight of fragment 50, untranslated. In considering the saying, we will for now only focus upon the relations named within it, so that our considerations may not wander in the realm of indeterminacy. Stated plainly, λόγος is: ὁ λόγος, the Logos; at stake here is a kind of “listening”— ἀκούειν, more precisely, a kind of having-listened-to-before, namely, to the Logos. Therefore, the Logos, which is heard and which can be heard, is a form of saying, an utterance: for the listening of the human that is meant by the saying is directed toward sounds and voices. However, the saying of Heraclitus’s begins with a sharp οὐκ, with a “not” that [244] rejects something, namely, something concerning human listening. οὐκ ἐμοῦ—you should not listen to me, to this particular human being and my speeches, simply in order to then report that you have heard Heraclitus.
οὐκ ἐμοῦ—you should not listen to me, says Heraclitus. It is also strange that the thinker begins with a “not” and a “no.” Perhaps it is the lot of thinkers to always be forced to begin that way, with a rejection and with resistance, so that the “yes” they perhaps say does not immediately fall into the category of that to which the human listens in his everyday life (e.g., in idle talk, in cinema, and on the radio). However, the “not” and “no” with which the saying of Heraclitus’s begins is, strictly speaking, not really so negative, and is not an utterance of mere resistance: it is perhaps rather a pointing toward a detaching and a jumping off.
οὐκ ἐμοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας
Have you not merely listened to me, but rather (ἀλλά) listened to the Logos?
According to this, the Logos is something audible, a kind of speech and a voice, but clearly not the voice of a human, which speaks through audible noises. Who is speaking as ‘the Logos ’? The Logos—what kind of voice is that? If not a human one and therefore not an audible one, is it then an inaudible voice? Does such a thing exist? Moreover, can one listen to such a thing? Wanting to listen to what does not make a sound: is that not like wanting to build castles in the sky? ‘To listen’—that means to apprehend something by means of the ear. For example, we listen to the noise that enters the ear. But, distinct from such an effortless and will-less hearing is the hearing in the manner of an attending to something whereby we, as the