what has been messaged to the human. σοφός sits within φιλόσοφος— σοφία sits within φιλοσοφία. However, in Greek, σοφόν is also always an echo of σαφές, which means luminous, manifest, radiant. σοφόν ἐστιν—the knowing/knowledge is, and this means always and most importantly for the Greeks that what-is-to-be-known stands σαφές (i.e., luminously manifest before us). We also attempt to elucidate σοφόν,  as understood by Heraclitus, with reference to fragments 32 and 112, about which we surely cannot provide a thorough interpretation here. Fragment 32 states:
ἓν τὸ σοφὸν μοῦνον λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει Ζηνὸς ὄνομα.
The One—which is the sole to-be-known—withholds itself from being said, while at the same time offering itself up as the sayable, in the name of Zeus (i.e., of ‘life,’ that is, of that which emerges luminously).
From this saying, we can first conclude that λέγεσθαι/λέγειν is unambiguously related to ὄνομα: noun, name, naming. However, in order that we may properly heed the word ὄνομα (i.e., name) and not understand it in an empty and damaged way, we must ponder an aspect of its meaning that can still be seen in the expression ‘to have a recognizable name,’ ‘to have a reputation.’ Here, name has the sense of renown, thought in an elevated sense, and not as mere fame. To have a name for oneself, to be known for it, thus means: to stand in the light, to be illuminated by it. Naming is illuminating, a bringing into the light, a bringing into the unconcealed. It is from this meaning that ὄνομα (i.e., name), as still remains to be shown, enters into a connection with λέγειν, i.e., a “saying” in which the merely linguistic and grammatical are not of primary importance. Later, of course, ὄνομα becomes a grammatical term that designates the substantive (i.e., the noun) in distinction to ῥῆμα, the verb. Presently, however, we will pay attention to τὸ σοφόν—the authentic to-be-known and the knowledge of it.
Knowledge—τὸ σοφόν/ἡ σοφία—is: to know what has been messaged, to stand within it. This knowledge is in itself already an authentic readiness to act and to do, one grounded upon an attending-to. In fragment 112 it is stated:
καὶ σοφίη ἀληθέα λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαΐοντας.
And so authentic knowledge consists in saying and doing the unconcealed, from out of an attending-to, along and in accordance with that which, in emerging from out of itself, shows itself.
Knowledge is, authentically and in itself, λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν—we translate this initially as: ‘saying’ and ‘doing’ (i.e., word and deed). We will, however, leave it  open if the saying is thereby already properly thought: for we do not yet know to what degree λέγειν means something like “saying,” nor do we know what “saying”
190 The Inception of Occidental Thinking