understood: the more originary the sameness of the self-same, the more essential is the difference within sameness, and all the more so the sameness of the same. ὁμολογεῖν σοφόν ἐστιν: authentic knowledge consists of an acknowledging, conceding concordance.

However, if we are to think this concordance properly, there is still an ambiguity that must be clarified. On the one hand, there belongs to concordance that with which—and that means, with whom —the concordance is such; and, on the other hand, there belongs that about which the concordance is concerned. Concordance can arise concerning a myriad of things: it can be about this or that matter, this or that circumstance, this or that task, this or that behavior. A concordance that, from this perspective, already appears manifold, can at the same time also be further differentiated [251] by the fact that it is a concordance between humans who, on the basis of precisely this concordance, may stand in greater proximity or distance to one another. But perhaps the human does not only stand in concordance with other humans. Perhaps there is a concordance in which the concern in relation to which the concordance exists is the same as that through which the concordance occurs. Such a ὁμολογεῖν would then be a distinguished one. And should not a concordance be a distinguished one precisely where it constitutes essential knowledge, i.e., τὸ σοφόν? With what is this ὁμολογεῖν in concordance? Heraclitus tells us: τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας—in the obedient listening to λόγος lies that knowledge that is in concordance ... with what? With what else but with λόγος itself? Can there be a more originary ὁμολογία than the one with λόγος itself? Obviously not. Here, λέγειν is of the kind that says the same as what the Logos says. But what is ὁ λόγος, “the Logos”? Heraclitus does not outright say: yet, he nevertheless does say by stating that authentic concordance exists when it is a concordance with “the Logos.”

ὁμολογεῖν σοφόν ἐστιν ἓν πάντα εἶναι.

Out of an obedient listening to the Λόγος is the knowledge that consists of saying the same as the Λόγος: one is all.


1) λόγος as assertion about beings by way of the idea ( εἶδος ), and the category in metaphysical thinking (Plato, Aristotle, Kant)

In the previous sessions, an attempt was made to shed some light on the origin of ‘logic’ from several diff erent perspectives. This was attempted with the aim of

192    The Inception of Occidental Thinking