A different manner of thinking may be able to illuminate the saying of Heraclitus’s. It is not being asserted that Heraclitus explicitly thought and said all of this. But if we think through what was just said, and continue to think through it in the days to come, then what is obscure, inceptual, and far-reaching in the saying can emerge to us, and the saying may indeed come to address us for the first time.

[344] There is no other way to gain clarity regarding the presence of the Λόγος for the human. If, however, all ‘logic’ originates from the human relation to the Λόγος, and if ‘logic’ dominates the sojourn of the modern human within beings, then we will one day have to think- aft er the Λόγος in a more originary way—more originarily even than Heraclitus did—in order to find our way about within ‘logic.’

Once we have finally experienced and thought through saying 72 for ourselves, it will show itself to us as the first, distant glimmer of a knowledge regarding being and the relation between the human and being.

The ambivalent two- fold of the relation of being to beings is the sign of the unusual position of the human amidst beings. In the ‘two’ of ‘two- fold,’ and in the ‘ambi’ of ‘ambivalent,’ a rupture is announced. In accordance with our habituation to metaphysical thinking, we are here easily inclined initially and solely to think of a division into two parts, to take up this division as an ‘opposition,’ and then to bend what is oppositional into its proper form through dialectics. However, the two-foldedness of the ambivalent two- fold is first to be thought in the direction of the rupture that rips open, and in the direction of the open in which the essence of the human, in the manner of this ambivalent two-foldedness, is folded and gathered, but at the same time also dispersed. (The ambivalent two- fold, the simplicity of the two-folded: the difference.)

Listening to saying 72 should give us some assistance in our attempt to think-after the relation of human λόγος to the Λόγος.

The ambivalent two-foldedness of the human sojourn amidst beings is unusual, not to say uncanny. This sojourn presupposes a place whose place-ness is not easily found by the human. That is why he must set out to seek for, and inquire about, this place of its essence.

We are concerned with the relation of human λόγος to the Λόγος. Said more precisely, human λόγος is not [345] one link of this relation while ‘the Λόγος ’ is the other link. Rather, human λόγος is itself the relation, and the Λόγος is, also, the same relation. It is not a relation between two λόγοι: rather, they themselves are the between and the in- between, within which everything between and relational has its essence and its relational rule. However, given a provisional understanding and an introductory manner of speaking, there is at first no other way to speak about the relation of human λόγος to the Λόγος. The Greeks themselves, and even Heraclitus, never had the proper words and the proper saying for this originary relatedness.

Such a saying only comes to language if the beyng to be thought here has come into its word. One day—and we know not when—beyng will come into such a

256    Logic: Heraclitus’s Doctrine of the Logos