λόγος to the Λόγος : however, this means to know that, and how, the Λόγος is presence and is the region toward which human λόγος is most turned in a manner of bearing. Therefore, no matter how much the designation may suggest it, ‘human λόγος ’ must never be thought of as a gathering relation belonging to the human which, as a peculiarly human relation, is somehow cut-off from its connection to the Λόγος as if enclosed by a boundary, on the other side of which is to be found a possible further relation to the Λόγος. On the contrary, the λόγος of the ψυχή, as human λόγος, is the μάλιστα διηνεκῶς ὁμιλεῖν Λόγῳ, the turning-toward the originary forgathering in a manner that bears it most of all. The human λόγος would not be λόγος at all were it not the gathering toward the originary forgathering: and it is from out of this originary forgathering, and as the relation to it, that the human has the proper essence of gathering. However, we now recognize the following: if μάλιστα διηνεκῶς ὁμιλεῖν is already a gathering, but also and more precisely a ὁμολογεῖν, then gathering and gathering are not always and exactly the same. At the same time, it also becomes apparent that the λόγος τῆς ψυχῆς—i.e., human λόγος— must always already be thought of as the gathering toward the originary forgathering. This human λόγος is itself only and precisely as the gathering toward the originary forgathering. All that continually pertains to human λόγος itself, and that which it, from out of itself and on its own accord as  λόγος, is, proceeds from out of, and resides in, the originary forgathering toward which it remains gathered.
Only when we keep all of this in mind do we remain in the realm of Heraclitean (and, more generally, Greek) thinking. Only from out of this realm can we then think-aft er that other saying of Heraclitus’s in which he speaks of the λόγος τῆς ψυχῆς, i.e., of human λόγος. It is fragment 115, and it states:
ψυχῆς ἐστι λόγος ἑαυτὸν αὔξων.
To the drawing-in drawing-out belongs a gathering that enriches itself from out of itself.
We will now mention the saying of Heraclitus’s that Hegel chose as the motto for his Phenomenology of Spirit, without elucidating or even translating the saying. We may assume, however, that Hegel chose precisely this saying as the motto for his work only aft er careful consideration, and sees within his own work the proper interpretation of this saying. In many ways, it would be illuminating to follow up on these relationships, in order to reveal in what form the Λόγος has become historically present in contemporary metaphysics, and thus in what form being addresses the contemporary human (and therefore us). However, this is not the occasion for such reflections. We must be satisfied with the suggestion that Hegel understands the Heraclitean λόγος as reason and understanding and, indeed, as the ‘divine’ and ‘absolute.’ In his Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel seeks to show how absolute reason, which before all else is thought as the subjectivity of self-consciousness (in the sense of Descartes), comes to itself