through the various stages of its self-appearing, and that in this developing it reveals its essence more and more. It was in view of this contemporary understanding of such a ceaselessly self-overcoming self-knowledge of the certainty of reason that Hegel [355] chose Heraclitus’s saying as a motto. As a consequence of this, a strictly circumscribed meaning is imposed upon Heraclitus’s saying, a meaning that remains foreign to Greek thinking in every respect. Even the common, contemporary translations of saying 115 reveal the prevalence of a metaphysical interpretation of λόγος. For example, Diels translates it as: “To the soul belongs meaning (world reason), which increases itself.” By contrast, Snell translates it as: “The soul has meaning, which from out of itself becomes ever richer.” Even if we keep in mind that any translation remains incomprehensible without its attendant interpretation, we may nevertheless conclude from these test cases that these translations have all arisen from out of metaphysical thinking. Insofar as this thinking understands its own history as containing within it a development toward the execution and consummation of an ever-higher self-consciousness of reason, then such a saying of Heraclitus’s, notwithstanding its venerability, must appear as something provisional and incomplete beyond which Spirit has already progressed. However, Heraclitus’s saying does not refer to the dialectical self-development of absolute reason: rather, it states that the essence of the human originates from out of the relation to being, and that this origin is the origin as such, insofar as it becomes ever more originary and abiding in its proper ownness. It is precisely this that remains difficult for us today to think-aft er, even if we do not interpolate the absolute metaphysics of reason’s development into the saying (as Hegel does). There remain enough other hurdles, even if, as though doing nothing, we simply continue to cling to our conventional opining. For clearly, the word that bears the emphasis in the saying is ἑαυτόν (in its relation to αὔξων): the λόγος of the soul (i.e., the human λόγος) enriches itself from out of itself. That certainly sounds as though the human contains within himself the source from out of which, on his own accord, he himself unfolds by way of himself, thereby creating and realizing the possibilities of his existence.

[356] However, what is the human λόγος itself as this λόγος? As λόγος, it is certainly already and especially gathered toward the originary forgathering. Therefore, as the gathering relation, the self-ness of the human λόγος does not consist in it pinching and tying itself off, as it were, in order then, in seeking itself, to draw everything back toward itself. Rather, it is itself the human λόγος, and precisely as λόγος it is the drawing-out self-gathering toward the originary forgathering. It is toward this originary forgathering that the human λόγος is pointed. As the one that points in such a far-reaching way, human λόγος is pointed toward the source of enrichment. The essential depth proper to λόγος, correctly understood, harbors within itself the possibility that it enriches itself from out of itself. When and how does the human λόγος become richer? When it is more gathered toward the originary forgathering. This becoming-richer of the human λόγος is not enacted through the growing influx of beings, but rather through the usually absencing presence of ‘the Λόγος ’ (that is, of being itself) becoming a

266    Logic: Heraclitus’s Doctrine of the Logos