in the middle of the realm that the Greeks intended, but did not specifically discuss further. ‘ To bring ’ ‘ forth ’ from out of concealment, as in, for example, the bringing ‘forth’ of the visage of the god in a block of marble; thought in a Greek way, this means ‘to make’ a statue. All ‘placing-forth’ is grounded in such a bringing-forth, in such authentic ποιεῖν. In order to think it in a Greek way, we must think ‘placing-forth’ thusly : to place-forth the beams (i.e., lumber) from out of the tree trunk and its wood, and to place-forth the woodwork from out of the beams; this is the activity of bringing-forth, of placing-forth—ποίησις—the bringing of beings as beings from out of concealment and into appearance in unconcealment. Still today, we use the worn-down foreign word ‘poesy’/‘poetic’ . (We use both ‘poesy’ and Dichtung [poetry].) The doctrine and theory of the poetic arts is called ‘poetics.’ For the Greeks, poeticizing is also already a ποίησις, a “making”: but what is actually made thereby is what is brought-forth in the sense of coming to shine forth in the poetically-said word, and thereby continuing to shine, ever anew, in the word. In the same way, ‘to do’ is akin to stepping into appearance and allowing to appear. ποιεῖν / ποίησις—bringing-forth/placing-forth—brings forth and places forth into unconcealment what before this had not yet appeared. ποιεῖν is primarily thought along the lines of a human comportment. In this sense, ποίησις is the essential opposite of φύσις. φύσις designates emerging-from-out-of-itself, allowing to go-forth, to bring-forth in the originary sense of bringing. ποίησις is the bringing-forth executed by the human: and such a bringing necessarily presupposes a ‘harvesting’ in the full sense of gathering as previously elucidated. All ποίησις is always dependent upon φύσις, but not only in the sense that the latter is a necessary prerequisite, as when, for example, the placing-forth of a ship necessitates building materials, the beams and wood which have of themselves originally emerged as tree and thereby reached presence. More importantly, however, ποίησις adheres to φύσις in the sense that what is actually being brought-forth—for example, the visage of the god in the block of marble—is what peers in, and does so in the manner of emerging from out of itself. This emerging takes place in advance and approaches the human, and human bringing-forth adheres to it. ποιεῖν takes φύσις as its measure—it is κατὰ φύσιν. Such being in accordance with φύσις—such following-aft er the possibilities given by φύσις and through its realm; all of this talk of “aft er,” “accordance,” “through,” and “along”—all of this is meant by the word κατά. The one who knows is the one who brings-forth in view of what emerges-from-out-of-itself: that is, who brings-forth in view of what reveals itself and before this revealing does not appear and has not appeared. ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν patently does not mean “to make something in the likeness of nature,” in the sense of a poor imitation of what lies before at hand.
 However, as we would like to argue, bringing-forth—i.e., ποιεῖν itself and as such—is not an essential element of knowing. Rather, ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν—i.e., placing-forth into view what emerges and what is to-be-uncovered in such a way that the human is gathered toward it—is ἀληθέα λέγειν. It is not bringing
274 Logic: Heraclitus’s Doctrine of the Logos