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of πάντα that, in Fr. 1, are spoken of as moved, and moved, that is, in accord with the λόγος.
HEIDEGGER: Following the overall sense of Fr. 7, πάντα are thus related to γνῶσις [inquiry], to grasping humans.
FINK: γνῶσις with respect to πάντα is possible, however, only in so far as πάντα are distinct in themselves. πάντα are moved in accord with λόγος. In their movement, in their change and passage, which lightning steers, they are at the same time distinct by themselves. The movement of the outbreaking lightning gleam lets πάντα come forth as distinct by themselves.
HEIDEGGER: Yet with the preliminary orientation, concerning the way τὰ πάντα are addressed by Heraclitus, you have already landed us in an entire philosophy. {GA 15: 37}
FINK: But I still want to stick to the point that the essential thing in Fr. 7 is the reference of πάντα back to γνῶσις and διάγνωσις.
HEIDEGGER: While πάντα in Fr. 1 are seen in their reference to λόγος. which is not of human character, they are mentioned in Fr. 7 in their reference to human cognizance. Subsequently, διανοεῖσθαι [think through] and διαλέγεσθαι [dialogue] then develop themselves out of διαγιγνώσκειν [distinguish]. διαγνοῖεν is an indication that πάντα are characterized as what is distinguishable, but not what is already distinguished.
PARTICIPANT: If λόγος is discussed in Fr. 1, and διάγνωσις is discussed in Fr. 7, can't one then refer the γνῶσις of πάντα to λόγος?
HEIDEGGER: You assume too much thereby. You pursue the connection between human γνῶσις and λόγος. But we want first to get acquainted with the different ways in which Heraclitus speaks of τὰ πάντα.
PARTICIPANT: But isn't the ontic being [Seiendsein] of πάντα, which comes to speech in ὄντα, a quality of πάντα which is a necessary presupposition for διάγνωσις?
FINK: I concede that the ontic being of πάντα is a necessary presupposition for the discerning human cognizance. But ὄντα is no quality of πάντα. We must, however, keep in mind that ὄντα is added to the content of πάντα in Fr. 7 as hitherto treated.
HEIDEGGER: But do we then know what τὰ πάντα means? We would only come closer to the matter, if we would be concerned with the nose, the eyes, and with hearing.
FINK: In our context, the phrase καὶ γινόμενα πάντα κατ᾽ ἔριν καὶ χρεών in Fr. 80 now interests us.5 Here also πάντα γινόμενα are named; {GA 15: 38} now, however, not κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε as in Fr. 1, but κατ᾽ ἔριν [according to strife]. At first, we leave out of account the phrase καὶ χρεών [according to obligation]. Now πάντα and their manner of movement
5. Diels' translation runs: "and that everything happens according to dissension and obligation."