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are referred not to λόγος, but to strife. In Fr. 80, πάντα enter into a context of meaning with strife. It is reminiscent of πόλεμος—Fr. 53, to which we will yet turn.—From Fr. 10, we single out the phrase: ἐκ πάντων ἓν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα.6 Here also we meet with a becoming, but not with what is meant by the movement of individual entities; rather, we meet with the becoming of a whole.
HEIDEGGER: If we view it naively, how could ἐκ πάντων ἓν be understood?
PARTICIPANT: Read naively it would mean that a whole gets put together out of all the parts.
HEIDEGGER: But the second phrase, ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα, already indicates to us that it is not a question of a relationship of a part and a whole which is composed of parts.
FINK: In Frs. 1 and 80, πάντα γινόμενα are mentioned. Their being moved was referred on one hand to λόγος and on the other hand to strife. In accord with λόγος and strife means: in accord with the movement of λόγος and strife. We have distinguished this movement from the being moved of πάντα. It is not the same kind of movement as the movement of πάντα. In Fr. 10, movement is brought up, but in the sense of how one comes out of everything and everything comes out of one.
HEIDEGGER: Which movement do you mean here? {GA 15: 39}
FINK: The world-movement. With this, nevertheless, too much has been said. We have noticed that one can understand ἐκ πάντων ἓν naively as a relationship of part and whole. That one comes out of many is a familiar phenomenon. However, the same thing does not allow expression in reverse manner. Many does not come out of one, unless we mean only bounded allness in the sense of a multiplicity and a set. τὰ πάντα is, however, no concept of bounded allness, no concept of set, but a quintessence. We must distinguish the concept of allness, in the sense of quintessence as it is given in τὰ πάντα, from the numerical or generic allness, that is, from a concept of relative allness.
HEIDEGGER: Do all the books that are arranged here in this room constitute a library?
PARTICIPANT: The concept of a library is ambiguous. On one hand, it can mean the entire set of books lying here before us; but on the other hand, it can also mean the equipment other than the books, that is, the room, the shelves, etc. The library is not restricted to the books that belong to it. Also, when some books are taken out, it is still a library.
HEIDEGGER: If we take out one book after another, how long does it remain a library? But we see already that all the individual books together do not make up a library. "All," understood as summative, is quite different from allness in the sense of the unity of the peculiar sort that is not so easy to specify at first.
6. Diels translates: "out of everything, one: and out of one, everything."