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and the three time determinations toward the time forming of πῦρ ἀείζωον, in the sense of the letting spring up of having-been, being-present, and coming-to-be, has no clue, and cannot, therefore, be rightly carried through.
FINK: For me the clue is this, that it is impossible to talk of πῦρ ἀείζωον as within time. Otherwise, it becomes a thing that happens in the world, perhaps also the highest thing, the summum ens, which, however, is an ens in the midst of things. Seen thus, it would be subordinate to time. My question is, however, whether the determinations of being-in-time are not subordinated to πῦρ ἀείζωον.
HEIDEGGER: So far as I can see, there is only this clue, that πῦρ ἀείζωον is no thing and that, therefore, no "was," "is" and "will be" can be predicated of it, ... {GA 15: 102}
FINK: ... and also no perpetuity in the ordinary sense.
HEIDEGGER: We stand before the question of how πῦρ ἀείζωον relates itself to time. One does not get further. In the summer semester of 1923 in Marburg, while working out Being and Time, I held a lecture on the history of the concept of time. As I investigated the archaic idea of time with Pindar and Sophocles, it was striking that nowhere is time spoken of in the sense of the sequence. Rather, time is there taken in view as that which first grants the sequence—similarly as in the last paragraphs of Being and Time, although the problem is there viewed from Dasein.—I look at my watch and find that it is three minutes before 7 P.M. Where is the time there? Try to find it.