63
HEIDEGGER: The "always" is then understood as "at all times," "permanent." In Latin one speaks of the sempiternitas [always-eternity]. That we do not really make progress here is based on the fact that in the fragment time is not spoken about thematically; nevertheless, the interpretation attempts to take time into view in a decisive sense. Only thus, I believe, can we make clear to ourselves the way of your interpretation. While, according to the trivial rendition, the first half of the sentence says that the κόσμος is brought forth neither by one of the gods nor by a human, and the second half, which begins with ἀλλά, says that the κόσμος always was, is, and will be eternal-living fire, according to your interpretation the subject of the second half of the sentence is not κόσμος but πῦρ.
FINK: According to the smoother version, as Diels proposes, fire is a predicative determination of κόσμος. Yet the antecedent phrase should already draw attention. If {GA 15: 107} we translate, "this κόσμος is brought forth to appearance neither by one of the gods nor by a human," then κόσμος although spoken negatively-moves into view as something brought forth. Thereby, the connection to fire as that which brings forth is already given. We do not understand fire as a predicative determination of κόσμος; rather, we understand κόσμος from out of fire as the beautiful joining of τὰ πάντα which is brought forth to appearance neither by one of the gods nor by a human. There was always and is and will be eternal-living fire in the light-shine of which the beautiful joining of τὰ πάντα shines up. "It always was and is and will be" we must understand in the sense of "there is." Thus seen, κόσμος is comprehended from out of fire, and not fire from out of κόσμος. This rendition would fit in with the trail in which we have interpreted the connection of lightning and sun to τὰ πάντα up to now. The reference of πῦρ and κόσμος would be a special relationship of ἕν and πάντα, according to which τὰ πάντα stand in the light-shine of fire. The smoother rendition has the advantage that the subject remains the same in both halves of the sentence. Thus, fire becomes a determination of κόσμος instead of, the other way around, κόσμος being brought forth to appearance in the shine of fire. Only if the subject in the second half of the sentence is not κόσμος, is there a superiority of fire vis-à-vis κόσμος. Here we could also point to Fr. 124: ὥσπερ σάρμα εἰκῆ κεχυμένον ὁ κάλλιστος (ὁ) κόσμος. Diels translates: "(Like) a heap of things (?) scattered at random, the most beautiful (world) order." Here the most beautiful world order is said to be like a junk heap.
HEIDEGGER: One could translate κάλλιστος κόσμος: the κόσμος as it can only be in general.
FINK: The most beautiful κόσμος, the most beautiful ordered entirety of all πάντα, comes forth to appearance in the shine of fire. If this κόσμος is like a junk heap, {GA 15: 108} we have a hard contrast between κάλλιστος,